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Abstract 
Cognitive behavioral theories suggest that depressed people have negatively distorted and 
inaccurate perceptions and cognitions. The present study measures the accuracy of 
cognitions by comparing predictions made by depressed and by nondepressed students 
when they estimate the scores they will earn on an examination. It also compares 
depressed and nondepressed students on their levels of satisfaction with their exam 
scores. No difference was found between depressed and nondepressed students in either 
their predictions of their exam grades or their level of satisfaction with their exam grades. 
This study fails to support the notion that depression correlates with negative cognitive 
distortions. Depressed and nondepressed students were alike in their cognitive accuracy 
in predicting exam grades and in their cognitive satisfaction level with their grades. 
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Realism or Distortion 1 
Realism or Distortion in Predicting and Evaluating Exam Performance Among Depressed 
and Nondepressed Students 
There is a growing body of cognitive-behavioral literature suggesting that 
depressed patients are predisposed to negative distortions in their thought processes. 
Freeman and Oster (1999) have gone so far as to suggest that some depressed people 
have dysfunctional beliefs that rise to the level of almost fixed delusional quality. For 
example, Freeman and Oster describe a depressed patient who believes himself to be 
unloved and unlovable, in spite ofthe fact that 98.3 percent of the people in that 
depressed individual's life fmd him to be quite lovable. To maintain the belief in himself 
as unlovable, the patient must somehow distort his thinking to discount or explain away 
the vast majority of people in his life who love him. This is the kind of negatively 
distorted thinking that becomes the central focus oftreatment interventions for cognitive-
behavioral therapists working with depressed patients. Cognitive-behavioral therapists 
strive to help depressed patients eliminate their negative cognitive distortions and think 
more accurately and realistically. 
The research literature, however, does not consistently support the notion that 
those who are depressed think in a distorted manner. There are numerous studies that 
support the position that people who suffer from depression tend to be more negative in 
their thinking than those who do not suffer from depression (e.g. Alloy, Abramson, 
Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997). It is not clear, however, that the negative thoughts 
and beliefs of the depressed are distorted or inaccurate. In met, there is evidence that 
suggests the depressed are more accurate in their perceptions and judgments, but the 
nondepressed tend to distort their thinking in an overly positive direction (e.g. Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979). The conclusion that depressed people are more negative in their 
thinking is not disputed. The controversy arises when researchers suggest that the 
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negative thoughts of the depressed are distortions. That is the area in which research 
[mdings differ and are not conclusive. What is in dispute is not the negativity of the 
thoughts and beliefs for the depressed but the accuracy of those thoughts and beliefs. 
Because there is no clear consensus in the literature regarding the accuracy or the 
distortion of the thoughts, be Hefs, and perceptions 0 f either the depressed or the 
nondepressed, further study is necessary. 
The fIrst section of this paper will examine the cognitive-behavioral theOlY of 
depression as proposed by Aaron Beck. Dr. Beck's concept of cognitive schema will be 
explained along with its influence on the thinking of people who have depressive 
symptoms. The next section of the paper will explore the research literature that 
demonstrates the fact that those who suffer from depression are more negative in their 
thinking than their counterparts who do not suffer from depression. 
Depressive realism will be examined in the next section of the paper. Depressive 
realism is the notion that those who have depressive symptoms are actually more realistic 
and accurate in their thinking than those who do not have depressive symptoms. This 
concept suggests that depression tends to allow people to see things more realistically, 
while those who are not depressed have an unjustifIed and unrealistic optimism that 
distorts their thinking in an overly positive direction. 
A number of studies are then reviewed that shed light on the accuracy of the 
cognitions of depressed research participants with regard to their social performance. 
Research [mdings in the area of social performance and self-evaluations of that social 
performance are complex and unclear. There is evidence to suggest that depressed people 
are more realistic and accurate in evaluating their own social performance, including their 
impact on others. There is also evidence to suggest that the depressed see themselves in a 
more negative light than their social interaction partners see them. There is further 
evidence indicating that depression in one partner of a social dyad influences the 
Realism or Distortion 3 
nondepressed partner to alter his or her social interactions and actually to behave in a 
more negative manner. 
Attributional theory is explained in the next section of the paper. Cognitive 
attributions can influence peoples' reactions to negative events as well as to positive 
events that occur in their lives. With some patterns of attribution, depressive symptoms 
I 
become less likely while other attributional patterns seem to increase the likelihood of 
depression as an emotional reaction when negative or unpleasant events occur. 
The next sections of the paper deal with possible gender-effects in research on 
depression and the use of self-report instruments in depression research. The research 
literature does not suggest that gender plays an influential role in studies of judgment, of 
perception, or of predictions made by depressed and nondepressed participants. Self-
report psychological tests are used in the research design described in this paper. 
Therefore, the strengths and limitations of self-report psychological measures are 
reviewed. 
The research methodology is then described in detail. The present study measures 
the accuracy of cognitions by comparing predictions made by depressed and by 
nondepressed students when they estimate the scores they will eam on a fInal 
examination for school. It also compares depressed and nondepressed students on their 
level of satisfaction with their exam scores. 
Review of the Literature 
Aaron Beck's cognitive-behavioral theory of depression involves cognitive 
distortions or faulty information processing as a core concept (Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979, Beck & Freeman, 1990; Beck, 1996). Beck suggested that 
depressed persons perceive situations negatively when a more positive interpretation is 
Realism or Distdrtion 4 
equally possible and more accurate. His cognitive triad of depression involves an 
inclination to view the self, the world, and the future in a negative light. According to 
Beck's theory, the depressed person's cognitions are negatively biased and operate by 
filtering out positive information, exaggerating negative interpretations instead. These 
negative expectations and interpretations lead to depressed affect. 
In Beck's theory, schema are used to explain systematic patterns of errors in 
thought or in cognitive distortions made by depressed persons. Schema are cognitive 
structures derived from past experiences that operate to interpret and give meaning to 
current experiences. They guide subsequent perceptions and judgments. For instance, 
negative self-schema can lead depressed people to view themselves as unworthy and 
undesirable. This view, in turn, can bias their judgments of events so that they appear to 
be evidence of failure or rejection. Information that is not consistent with the negative 
schema is overlooked or ignored; confIrmatory data, however, is given undue weight. 
Segal (1988) explains it well when he writes, "Cognitive distortions are the products of 
the misinterpretation or misperception of objective reality in such a way that the 
conclusions reached by depressed people confIrm their negative expectations" (p. 148). 
The cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1967; Ellis, 1973; Seligman, 1975) 
have been extremely influential in explaining the phenomenon of depression and in 
shaping the therapeutic interventions used to treat it. The cognitive approaches generally 
suggest that patients' patterns ofthinking are the foundations oftheir affective life, and 
that negative thought patterns produce and maintain depression. Therapeutic 
interventions are often designed to help the patient become aware of negative cognitions 
that lead to depression. Therapeutic improvement is fostered by guiding patients to 
eliminate negatively distorted perceptions in order to become more accurate in their 
cognitive assessments and conclusions. Therapists, for instance, will sometimes 
encourage depressed patients to be more empirical in their judgments and to evaluate 
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more accurately the "data" of their life-experiences. In short, patients are encouraged to 
correct inaccurate conclusions that they are imposing on events and to be more realistic in 
their understanding of events. Patients may be asked to conduct behavioral experiments 
as part of the therapy process. If patients believe that they are unpopular and that people 
dislike them, they may be encouraged to ask a sample of 10 people whom they know if 
they are liked or disliked. When some of those surveyed respond favorably, the depressed 
patients are encouraged to reevaluate their negative cognitions regarding unpopularity 
and worthlessness. Such a cognitive-behavioral approach is based on the notion that 
depressed persons' thoughts are distorted, inaccurate, and incorrect. In therapy, patients 
attempt to experience events in a less biased way in order to shift negative cognitive 
distortions in a more positive and accurate direction. 
Depressed Are More Negative Than Nondepressed 
A variety of studies have demonstrated the fact that the depressed are more aware 
of and more active in processing negative self-referent information when compared with 
the nondepressed (Alloy, Abramson, Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997; Gara, 
Woolfold, Cohen, & Goldston, 1993; Gotlib, 1982; Nelson & Craighead, 1977; Segal, 
Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). These studies 
support the notion that depressed people are more negative in their thinking in that they 
are more aware of negative feedback. However, increased awareness does not necessarily 
mean distortion. Without some independent measure of reality, we cannot conclude that 
depressed people are negatively distorting reality, just that they have a heightened 
awareness ofthe negative aspects of reality. It remains possible that those who are 
depressed are actually experiencing a more negative reality than those who are not 
depressed. This is exactly the conclusion suggested by Coyne and Gotlib (1983). They 
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are critical of the conclusion that the cognitive theorists have offered which suggests that 
depression is the result of negative distortions of reality. Coyne and Gotlib offer the 
alternative hypothesis that depression is produced and maintained by negative life 
circumstances that are accurately perceived by the depressed person. Coyne and Gotlib 
agree that depressed persons evaluate themselves and their performance more negatively 
than do nondepressed controls, but they question whether these evaluations are 
distortions. They suggest, instead, that depression is more closely related to actual 
environmental antecedents and consequences and is not determined by cognitive 
distortions of reality. They believe that negative realities produce and maintain 
depression rather than negative cognitions that distort reality. 
In an interesting demonstration of negative realities, Swann, Hixon, and De La 
Ronde (1997) found that marriage partners were most committed to spouses who 
confirmed their own self-view. That was also true when that self-view was negative. 
Depressed persons were more committed to spouses who shared their negative view of 
themselves than to spouses who had a more positive view than they, themselves, held. 
Therefore, depressed people with negative self-concepts were more committed to their 
marriages if their spouses held negative views of them than if their spouses held more 
positive views of them. This study seems to provide evidence that depression and 
negative self-conceptions become self-fulfilling. Awareness of negative feedback about 
the self among the depressed becomes increasingly confirmed and is, therefore, 
increasingly accurate within the depressed person's environment. This may be the result 
of the depressed person's tendency to associate selectively with people who confIrm their 
own beliefs about their inadequacies and unworthiness. 
Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressed college students were more 
pessimistic than nondepressed students when predicting future successes and failures. 
Both depressed and nondepressed participants predicted more successes than failures in 
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their futures. However, the depressed group was much more pessimistic than the 
nondepressed group when forecasting future events in their own lives as well as in the 
lives of hypothetical others similar to themselves. The nondepressed group showed more 
optimism in their predictions for their own future. 
One study demonstrated physiological evidence of increased negative 
expectations among the depressed (Blackburn, Roxborough, Muir, Glabus, & 
Blackwood, 1990). Event Related Potentials (ERPs) are physiological reactions that 
reflect information processing activities within the brain. The amplitude of the ERP is 
assumed to be an empirical measure of the strength of information processing within the 
individual. Information that is consistent with the individual's expectations requires a 
lower amplitude response to process than information that is inconsistent with the 
individual's expectations. Depressed participants showed lower amplitude responses to 
negative stimuli than to neutral or positive stimuli. Nondepressed participants showed 
larger amplitude responses to negative stimuli than to neutral or positive stimuli. The 
authors conclude that those who are depressed expect negative information and process 
that information with less effort, while the nondepressed are more easily aroused by 
negative stimuli because it is inconsistent with their expectations. 
Depressive Realism and Accuracy 
Alloy and Abramson (1979) shook the foundations of the cognitive theory of 
depression when they conducted a study in which depressed participants were more 
accurate in their judgments than the nondepressed participants who demonstrated a 
tendency to distort their perceptions in a positive direction. They tested a deduction from 
the learned helplessness model (Seligman, 1975) which hypothesized that depressed 
individuals will underestimate the degree of contingency between their behavior and 
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environmental outcomes. The model suggests that having learned to be helpless, 
depressed people will not expect their actions to lead to results. Participants were asked 
to press a button or not to press a button. The environmental outcome was a green light 
that either turned on or did not tum on. Participants were then asked to estimate the 
degree of contingency between their button-pressing and the onset of the light. 
Undergraduates from the University of Pennsylvania were studied and were assigned to 
depressed and nondepressed groups on the basis oftheir Beck Depression Inventory 
scores. Green light onset was fixed at 25%,50%, and 75% levels and was not contingent 
upon whether the students pushed the button or not. When the outcome (onset ofthe 
light) occurred infrequently (25%), both the depressed and the nondepressed groups were 
accurate in estimating the percentage of light-onset when they pushed the button and 
when they did not. However, when the light-onset became more frequent, the 
nondepressed participants developed an illusion of control believing their behavior was 
controlling the illumination ofthe light. That is, they overestimated how much control 
they had. The depressed participants, rather than underestimating their control (as they 
might ifthey felt helpless), were more accurate in their judgments than the nondepressed 
participants. They seemed to detect correctly the noncontingency between their responses 
and the outcomes. Indeed, they seemed to have an accurate, not distorted, perception of 
their control in the experimental task. The nondepressed participants displayed a 
cognitive distortion in this task rather than the depressed participants. 
Dobson and Pusch (1995) repeated the Alloy and Abramson experimental design 
using 15 clinically depressed, 15 remitted, and 15 never-depressed subjects. Their results 
did not confll'm the Alloy and Abramson findings. The results indicated the depressed 
participants overestimated their degree of control by 43% and were not more realistic 
than the other two groups. In fact, all three groups demonstrated positively biased 
distortions; however, depressed people showed neither more accuracy nor more distortion 
Realism or Distortion 9 
than their nondepressed peers. The Dobson and Pusch study utilized clinically depressed 
patients as participants while the Alloy and Abramson study used students who reported 
depressive signs but who were not clinically diagnosed nor in treatment. 
A number of studies have substantiated the fact that depressed participants, both 
students and patients, make accurate judgments in tasks of skill or of chance such as dice 
I 
games (Go lin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977; Golin, Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1979; Smolen, 
1978). It tends to be the nondepressed participants who distort reality by developing an 
illusion of control involving chance tasks in which their behavior is not influencing the 
outcome. When reinforcement is frequent, though independent of the participant's 
control, nondepressed people are especially likely to believe they are controlling the 
reinforcement (Langer, 1975a; Langer, 1975b; Miller & Ross, 1975; Tennen & Sharp, 
1983 Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). This may, in part, explain the popularity 
of gambling. Vazquez (1987) found that both depressed and nondepressed participants 
make accurate judgments of the degree of contingency between their actions and 
outcomes when there is no reward, such as money, for correct judgments. When a reward 
was involved, the nondepressed (but not the depressed) showed an illusion of control in 
noncontingent (chance) situations. However, the depressed showed an illusion of control 
when the outcomes were negative in nature. When the outcome involved negative self-
referent sentences, the depressed participants overestimated the degree of contingency 
between their responses and the appearance of negative self-referent sentences. That is, 
when negative statements about the self were the motivator instead of money, the 
depressed participants showed the distorted cognitions. They thought they were 
controlling the frequency of the negative statements. The author comments that excessive 
self-blame in the depressed may result in bias and distortion as they perceive the 
contingency between their acts and negative consequences. 
Tang and Critelli (1990) studied depressive realism in mildly depressed students 
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using moneyas an incentive and employing immediate feedback and repeated tasks in 
order to allow participants to learn from experience. The mildly depressed made more 
accurate judgments and the nondepressed overestimated their control. "When given 
feedback and further task exposure, mild depressives showed the ability to learn from 
experience and to modify their judgments of control; however, the nondepressives did 
not. The authors suggested that depressives may not be motivated by self-esteem, which 
is already low, while nondepressed participants may protect and enhance their self-
esteem by maintaining an illusion of controL Ifthis is true, it is certainly a flawed 
strategy for the nondepressed as it is likely to lead to larger disappointments and failures 
through denial and illusion. An experimental shift in focus to the disadvantages or the 
costs of taking ineffective action tends to improve the accuracy of judgments among 
nondepressed participants (Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1988). That is, the 
nondepressed seem to develop a positively distorted bias about their level of control 
when pursuing rewards but become more realistic and accurate when trying to avoid 
negative consequences. 
Nelson and Craighead (1977) reported that depressed participants recalled less 
positive and more negative feedback than did controls in tests of memory for positive and 
negative feedback. This fmding supports the notion of a negatively distorted bias among 
the depressed. However, the depressed participants were more accurate about the actual 
amount of negative feedback received, but the nondepressed group underestimated 
negative feedback. In their study, Nelson and Craighead provided both positive and 
negative feedback to depressed and nondepressed participants. When positive feedback 
was high and negative feedback was low, the depressed participants recalled feedback 
that was less positive and more negative than their nondepressed peers. The depressed 
participants were more accurate in their recall of the negative feedback, however, while 
the nondepressed tended to underestimate it. The authors comment that nondepressives 
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tend to filter out a certain amount of low frequency negative feedback, possibly to 
preserve their self-image. The depressed group remained more sensitive to all instances 
of aversive stimulation and were more fully able to recall it. In this study the depressives 
were more accurate about the negative but less accurate about the positive feedback, 
indicating that distortions may be unidirectional. While negative feedback is given an , 
accurate amount of perception and recall, positive feedback is underestimated. The net 
effect is that a larger proportion of negative feedback is processed relative to its presence 
in the environment, though its absolute value is accurate and realistic. Negative 
distortions, therefore, may occur more in the relative weight assigned to incoming 
information than in the absolute accuracy of the information. Additionally, accuracy 
among the depressed may be better with negative than with positive information. In a 
commentary on four studies, Alloy and Lipman (1992) pointed out that depressed 
participants seemed to prefer an evenhanded mixture of favorable and unfavorable 
appraisals; the nondepressed participants, however, show a bias for favorable feedback 
about themselves. 
Schwartz and Garamoni (1986) proposed a model of positive and negative states 
of mind in which they suggest that the optimal balance between positive and negative 
cognitions is 62% to 38%. This balance allows a healthy, adaptive person to maintain a 
predominantly positive state of mind while still being able to focus maximal attention on 
negative or threatening events. Negative events and cognitions occupy a significant, 
though not the greatest, proportion of their awareness in order to activate coping 
strategies to deal effectively with problems, dangers, and threats. The model suggests that 
healthy persons will allocate 38% oftheir cognitive and affective resources to the 
negative aspects of their environment, and this proportion maintains a homeostatic 
balance. Negative events are rendered maximally striking in order to activate adaptive 
responses. Negative events, while they loom large, are nevertheless perceived against a 
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background of predominantly positive events and perceptions in the healthy person. 
Schwartz and Garamoni argue against the idea that healthier people have more positive 
cognitions and emotions and that their greater health is characterized by higher 
proportions of positivity. They suggest, instead, that the healthy person maintains a 38% 
negative state of mind. Depression results when that proportion is exceeded. The 
depressed person will have a predominantly negative state of mind with the smaller 
proportion being allocated to positive thoughts and feelings. This model suggests that it is 
not only the mental recording of negative. and positive events that is important but also 
the weight that is given to those events that determines their influence within the 
individual. 
Martin, Abramson, and Alloy (1984) reported that depressed students tended to 
judge their personal control accurately in a positive outcome situation that was not really 
under their control. They tended to overestimate the control of another person in the same 
situation, however. That is, they saw others as being in control of positive outcomes in 
situations that were objectively outside oftheir control; they did not, however, consider 
themselves to be in control in similar situations. The judgment of the depressed 
participants was accurate and realistic regarding their own control ofthe positive 
outcome being offered. Nondepressed participants tended to overestimate their own 
control but perceive the other person's control more accurately. These results suggest that 
those who are depressed see themselves, accurately, as not in control in situations where 
they are truly not in control. However, the accuracy oftheir perceptions may be the 
highest under negative circumstances such as feeling no control in positive or favorable 
events, although it appears to them that others are in control ofthose positive events. 
Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressed participants were more pessimistic 
than nondepressed participants in predicting hypothetical future successes and failures in 
their lives. Both groups predicted more successes than failures for themselves, but the 
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depressed participants were more pessimistic in their overall forecasts for the future. The 
nondepressed participants tended to have a self-enhancing bias since they overestimated 
their probability of successes and underestimated their probability of failures relative to 
hypothetical others who are similar to themselves. The authors concluded that the 
depressed were more pessimistic than the nondepressed, but also more realistic since they 
I 
foresaw their futures as being similar to those of others like themselves. The 
nondepressed group was more optimistic but demonstrated a self-enhancing bias in that 
they foresaw their futures as brighter than those of others like themselves. 
In a fascinating demonstration of why it is valuable to include a measure of 
objective reality, Dunning and Story (1991) collected predictions for the future academic 
year from depressed and nondepressed college students. They found no difference 
between the groups in predicting positive events, but the depressed were much more 
likely to predict that undesirable events would occur in their futures. Although the 
depressed were more pessimistic in predicting negative events, an examination of the 
actual events that occurred after the predictions were made indicated they had still been 
overly optimistic. Depressed participants experienced fewer positive and more aversive 
outcomes than even they had anticipated. In short, the depressed were not pessimistic 
enough; and, as a result, the depressed were much less accurate than their nondepressed 
peers. The authors write, "Paradoxically, depressed subjects exhibited more unrealistic 
optimism than nondepressed respondents" (p. 527). An examination of actual events that 
followed the prediction phase of the study revealed that the depressed participants were 
less accurate than the nondepressed when they made optimistic predictions such as ideas 
that a mvorable event would happen to them or an unfavorable event would not happen. 
The depressed group showed less accuracy when they predicted a positive event would 
occur. They were also less accurate when they predicted an undesirable event would not 
occur even though they predicted more undesirable events than the nondepressed group 
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did to begin with. The authors conclude the depressive realism hypothesis was not 
supported. They also speculate that depression may negatively influence future outcomes 
even more than it seems to influence, negatively, predictions of the future. Possibly the 
depressed lack the emotional, motivational, or social resources needed to attain the 
positive outcomes they desire. 
In a review article, Ackermann and DeRubeis (1991) found that there were 19 
studies that support the notion that the depressed are more realistic than the 
nondepressed. However, there are 14 published articles with findings inconsistent with 
the depression-realism hypothesis. They suggest that the depressed tended to be more 
accurate and evenhanded in those studies involving contingency judgments or self-other 
judgments. That is, the depressed seemed to judge their level of control more accurately 
than the nondepressed when contingencies that were actually outside of their control 
made up the experimental tasks. Likewise, the depressed made more "realistic" and 
evenhanded judgments when estimating the likelihood of positive and negative events 
occurring in the future in their own lives compared with the lives of other people. 
However, the nondepressed seemed to be more accurate in those studies involving the 
recall of evaluative, self-referential feedback. 
Overly Positive Bias By the Nondepressed 
A number of studies have found that the depressed do not distort in a negative 
direction. In fact, the depressed participants in these studies saw reality more accurately 
than the nondepressed participants who demonstrated a bias in an overly positive 
direction. The Nelson and Craighead (1977) study already mentioned found the 
nondepressed participants were able to filter out or disregard low levels of negative 
feedback and were aware of the higher level of positive feedback. The nondepressed 
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seemed unaware of the negative feedback that was actually present in their environment 
while the depressed accurately perceived it. This suggests a selective attention bias 
among the nondepressed that shifts (or distorts) reality in a more positive direction than is 
totally accurate. This was certainly demonstrated in multiple studies previously 
mentioned in which nondepressed subjects developed illusions of control in games of 
I 
chance. 
Rizley (1978) found that depressed participants rated internal factors such as 
ability and effort as more important causes of negative events but as less important 
causes of positive events. The nondepressed participants demonstrated the opposite 
tendency, rating internal causal factors as important in their successes (positive events). 
The author refers to this as a "self-serving" bias on the part ofthe nondepressed 
participants. Some writers have suggested that mastery and competence are basic human 
needs; and, when a person attributes successes to personal effort, yet believes that failure 
is due to external circumstances, the person is motivated by the need for mastery through 
environmental control. Liu and Steele (1986) concluded, however, that when a person is 
deprived of control, the attributional analysis that takes place is motivated by the desire to 
protect the self-image rather than to regain environmental control. The self-serving bias 
seems to function more to protect self-esteem than to regain environmental control 
through mastery and competence. 
A number of studies have evaluated how the depressed and nondepressed view 
the future (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Cocker, Alloy, & Kayne, 1988). Nondepressed 
individuals tended to believe that positive events were more likely to happen to them than 
to others, but negative events were less likely to happen to them than to others. The 
authors refer to this as a self-enhancing cognitive bias or illusion. The depressed 
participants did not show this tendency to predict more positive and less negative future 
events for themselves compared with others, suggesting they had a more balanced, 
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evenhanded or statistically accurate view of the future. The authors ofthe studies believe 
nondepressed people show an unrealistic optimism about their own futures. The 
depressed are also more likely to predict successes than failures in their own futures, but 
they do not enhance their predicted futures compared with the futures they predict for 
others. Taylor and Brown (1988) write, "Because not everyone's future can be rosier than 
their peers', the extreme optimism that individuals display appears to be illusory" (p. 
197). The mildly depressed as well as those with low self-esteem seemed to maintain a 
more balanced view of their future prospects compared with the prospects of others, 
suggesting their perspective is more accurate. The nondepressed, however, entertain an 
overly optimistic distortion, according to the authors, because they expect more positive 
events in their futures than in the futures of other people. There is a danger, however, in 
drawing research conclusions regarding what is realistic and accurate without any 
independent and objective measure of that reality. As the Dunning and Story (1991) study 
demonstrated, it may seem as though the depressed are overly pessimistic in forecasting 
their futures, but actual events showed them to be overly optimistic. It remains to be 
demonstrated whether or not the nondepressed overestimate the positives in their futures 
by actually measuring the positive events that occur and comparing those with the 
predictions that are thought to be unrealistically positive. 
Taylor and Brown (1988) point out evidence that suggests nondepressed 
individuals have a positive view of themselves and tend to judge positive traits as more 
characteristic ofthemselves than are negative traits. They also suggest that normal people 
often perceive themselves as having improved on abilities that are important to them even 
when their performance has remained the same. In addition, nondepressed participants 
judge positive traits, abilities and attributes to be more characteristic ofthemselves than 
ofthe "average person." It seems that the nondepressed display a certain hubris with 
regard to their own traits and abilities. Because it is not logically possible for most people 
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to be better than average, Taylor and Brown add this to the evidence of a positive, or self-
enhancing bias that is characteristic of the nondepressed. Because the depressed 
demonstrate less of this bias, they are more realistic in their judgments and perceptions, 
according to Taylor and Brown. 
Dunning" Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) point out that students, when given 
broad ambiguous traits on which to rate themselves, tend to apply idiosyncratic 
defmitions which do have personal application. They also demonstrated the fact that 
when traits were more specifically defmed, there was no tendency to overapply the trait 
labels in a self-serving way. This may help to explain why normal participants seem to 
have an overly positive bias, but it does not help us understand why there is a difference 
on this dimension between normals and the depressed. 
A naturalistic study of homeowners living in an area devastated by brushfires 
(Parker, Brewer, & Spencer, 1980, as cited in Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998), 
found that many homeowners stayed behind to put water on their roofs as the fire 
approached. Water on the roofwas not effective in preventing the destruction of the 
homes by fire, and some homes were destroyed while others were spared. Those whose 
homes were not destroyed attributed more control to their actions and had significantly 
higher perceptions of control over avoiding future frre damage compared with those who 
lost their homes. The experience of failing to save their homes reduced the illusion of 
control while the success experience of having one's home spared increased the illusion 
of control. Depression or its absence were not directly assessed in this study. The 
naturalistic observation, however, suggests that failure feedback may be a key variable 
that helps produce accurate judgment in negative situations by removing illusions of 
control that lead to overly optimistic judgments. It may also be that depressed people 
have more experience with failure in therr lives or are more predisposed to perceive 
failure, leading to higher rates of accurate judgment in negatively-toned situations. 
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Matute (1995) studied failure feedback as the critical variable that affects the 
illusion of control or its opposite, learned helplessness. She points out that the 
experiments that demonstrated learned helplessness with humans provided the 
participants with failure feedback when their responses were ineffective. That is, when 
the participant's responses failed to terminate a loud, unpleasant noise, the participant 
was fully aware of the ineffectiveness of the response because the noise continued. In 
addition, when the noise did stop, the yoked participants (who were in the helpless 
condition) were informed that their responses were not correct and the noise terminated 
independently of any actions on their part (failure feedback). Matute's study 
demonstrated the fact that learned helplessness occurs only when failure feedback is 
provided. When failure feedback is not provided, the participants develop the illusion of 
control. Thus, exactly the same situation can lead to learned helplessness or the illusion 
of control depending upon the availability of failure feedback to the participants. It may 
be that experience with failure results in a person's being more aware of negative 
feedback and less alert for positive or success-oriented feedback. This may be 
particularly true when failure involves strongly aversive consequences, and avoidance 
behavior is prevented or is unsuccessful. 
Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) believe the evidence for positive illusions in the 
nondepressed is so strong that it is an important component of mental health and 
psychological well-being. They suggest that a substantial amount of research documents 
the prevalence of healthy, adaptive illusions in normal human cognition. Their analysis of 
the literature consistently fmds that the nondepressed possess an unrealistically positive 
view of the self, an exaggerated perception of personal control and an unrealistic 
optimism. With regard to illusions of control among the nondepressed, they observe that 
people often act as ifthey have control in situations that are determined by chance. This 
illusion, according to Taylor and Brown, provides a sense of personal control that is 
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integral to positive self-esteem. The depressed are less vulnerable to the illusion of 
control and also have lower levels of self-esteem. Taylor and Brown recommend that 
therapists foster positive illusions in their patients who are depressed so they can more 
closely approximate normal, healthy attitudes and functioning. Distortions in a positive 
direction are sug~ested as healthy although accurate perception of reality results in 
depression, according to these authors. 
Alloy and Clements (1992) experimentally tested the protective value of positive 
illusions. They applied a negative stressor, in the form of problems that were impossible 
to solve, to those who showed positive illusions as well as to those who did not. This was 
done in a laboratory setting ,and following the stressor, the participants' level of 
dysphoria was measured. They also followed the participants for a month after the 
laboratory segment of the experiment and measured their reactions to naturally occurring 
negative events in their lives outside of the lab. Their results suggest that those who show 
a greater illusion of control are less likely to show immediate negative mood effects 
following a fuilure experience in the lab. They are also less likely to show increases in 
depressive symptoms one month later after negative events have occurred in their lives. 
The authors conclude that positive illusions of control seem to provide some protection 
from depressive symptoms following a failure experience or following negative life 
events. The absence of positive illusions was a significant predictor of depressive 
symptoms, but the effect size was very small as this variable explained only 3-4% ofthe 
variance in depressive symptoms. 
Colvin and Block (1994; Block & Colvin, 1994) argue against Taylor and 
Brown's contention that positive illusions foster mental health. They suggest that it is far 
from proven that positive illusions are characteristic of the mentally healthy or that these 
illusions promote health. They disagree with the conclusions of Taylor and Brown and 
urge researchers to include valid and objective criteria in their studies to determine the 
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existence of illusion or distortion. Colvin and Block believe external criteria for reality 
can and should be included in research designed to aid in the determination of what is 
realistic and what is illusion. 
Negative Distortions Among the Depressed 
Many studies compare the depressed with the nondepressed and fmd those with 
depression are more negative in their thoughts, perceptions, and predictions than those 
without depression. Similarly, those without depression tend to have greater optimism 
compared with the depressed participants. Many ofthose same studies, however, imply, 
but are not able to actually judge, which group is more accurate, correct, or closer to the 
truth. Distortions suggest a departure from the true and accurate and should not be 
implied without some measure of realistic judgments to compare with the "negative" or 
''positive'' judgments ofthe participants. A study by Zarantonello, Johnson, and Petzel 
(1979) employed a task that could be measured for accuracy. They studied the accuracy 
of student judgment on a problem solving task. Participant groups were sorted according 
to D-scale scores on the MMPI. The experimenters were attempting to identify the 
conditions under which depressed persons might have distorted cognitions. No significant 
differences were found in the actual performance ofthe high-depressive and the low-
depressive groups on anagram solving tasks. However, the high-depressive group gave 
lower and more inaccurate estimates of how many anagrams they correctly solved under 
certain conditions. The high-depressives thought they did more poorly than they actually 
did when a difficult task (6-letter anagrams instead of 4-letter) was combined with high 
ego involvement. (They were told the task was an intelligence test and that their teachers 
would be given the results). The two groups did not differ when the task was easy (4-
letter anagrams), nor when it was difficult but carried no ego involvement pressures. The 
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high-depressives showed some negative distortion that was not realistically accurate 
(underestimating their success in problem solving) but only under conditions which 
involved difficulty and ego involvement together. Their actual performance, however, 
was not significantly lower than the nondepressed. 
A number of researchers have demonstrated the fact that the depressed do show 
, 
actual deficits in memory (Hartel & Hardin, 1990) and problem solving (Conway & 
Giannopolous, 1993). There is also some evidence to suggest that problem solving ability 
is an effective moderator for depression (Nezu, Kalmar, Ronan, & Clavijo, 1986). That 
is, effective problem solvers are less likely to become depressed even if they have a 
depressive attributional style. Teasdale (1983) did not deal with deficits in performance 
but pointed out that clinically depressed patients access negative and unpleasant 
memories more rapidly than positive memories. This tendency is more pronounced as 
depression becomes more profound. He concludes that there is a negative bias in the 
cognitions, especially in memories, that are available to people when in a depressed state. 
Experiments using the Stroop color-naming task showed that depressed 
participants showed increased latencies for negative self-descriptive words (Segal, 
Germar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995). Powell and Hemsley (1984) used a 
tachistoscope to expose depressed and control participants to unpleasant and neutral 
words. Recognition thresholds were individually calibrated at a 50% level for all 
participants. Depressed participants showed a tendency (p = .08) toward higher 
recognition of unpleasant words rather than of neutral words. Depressed persons also 
showed greater accuracy or selectivity for the negative and unpleasant stimuli. In a sense, 
the depressed participants showed inaccuracy of perception because their awareness of 
the unpleasant was disproportionately high although the pleasant was equally available to 
them. 
Lobitz and Post (1979) found the performance of depressed participants on a digit 
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symbol task similar to the performance ofthe nondepressed group although the depressed 
had lower levels of self-expectation and lower levels of self-evaluation on the task. In a 
related study (Alloy, Abramson, Murry, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997), participants at 
high cognitive risk for depression demonstrated greater cognitive processing of negative 
self-referent information and less processing of positive self-referent information. Thus, 
information processing of negative self-descriptions was more involved and active among 
those at high risk of depression; but their attention to positive self-descriptions was less. 
Social Feedback and Self-Evaluation 
A number of researchers have studied the differences between the performances 
the depressed and the nondepressed in social situations as well as their perceptions and 
evaluations of their social skills. Results in the area of social performance and self-
evaluation have been complex and unclear. One study that employed an independent 
"objective" criterion for reality measurement investigated self-ratings and observer-
ratings of social competence in depressed patients, in psychiatric control patients, and in 
normal control participants (Lewensohn, Mischel, Chaplain, & Barton, 1980). The 
depressed participants rated themselves as less socially competent than the two control 
groups, and the objective observers agreed. The depressed group was accurate in their 
self-perceptions compared with the observer-ratings; the controls, however, perceived 
themselves more positively than others saw them. The authors concluded that the lower 
self-ratings ofthe depressed participants were not a distortion, as would be predicted by 
cognitive theory, since they had seen themselves similarly to the way they were seen by 
observers. Instead, the control groups displayed the distorted perceptions by rating 
themselves more positively than observers rated them on positive attributes. The self-
perceptions of depressed participants were less discrepant from observer ratings than 
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were the self-perceptions of both the psychiatric and normal controls. 
Campbell and Fehr (1990), however, altered the experimental procedure and 
arrived at different conclusions. They noted that observers generally rate participants less 
positively than do interaction partners. They also suggested that observer ratings are 
overly harsh. Depressed people, who tend to be harsh on themselves, appear to be rating 
themselves accurately when compared with observer ratings because observers are also 
harsh. In the Campbell and Fehr study, low self-esteem participants viewed themselves 
less positively and believed their interaction partners would also view them less 
positively. In fact, the interaction partners did not differ in their ratings of low and high 
self-esteem participants. Overall, the low self-esteem group was less accurate (compared 
with a partner-rating measure) because they underestimated the positivity oftheir 
partners' ratings. Thus, comparisons with observer-ratings tend to confirm depressive 
realism while comparisons with interaction-partner-ratings do not. 
Colvin and Block (1994) argue that neither the depressed nor the well-adjusted 
were shown to be either more realistic or more accurate in their self-descriptions. The 
Lewensohn et al. (1980) study seemed to suggest that depressed participants were more 
accurate in their self-perceptions because their ratings of social competence more closely 
matched the ratings of observers; nondepressed group, however, overrated themselves 
compared with observer ratings. Colvin and Block point out, however, that the observers 
were told that they would be watching the interpersonal behavior of depressed 
individuals. They were not advised that two thirds of the participants they would be 
watching were not depressed. This may have biased the raters causing an overall 
lowering of their ratings; the result may have been that the depressed seemed to have 
accurate self-perceptions, but the nondepressed seemed to inflate their self-perceptions. 
This conjecture is supported by the fact that the observers, on average, rated all three 
groups as below average in social competence. Likewise, participants in all three groups 
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(including the depressed) rated themselves higher than the observers rated them. 
Gotlib and Robinson (1982) shed an entirely different light on the matter by 
suggesting that the depressed are not distorting their social reality in a negative way. 
They are actually experiencing and helping to create a negative reality for themselves. 
The interaction partners of depressed participants were found to smile less, to exhibit less 
arousal and pleasantness in their facial expressions, and to discuss less positive and more 
negative content in conversation. They also made fewer statements of direct support to 
their depressed partners. Although the interaction partners did not rate their depressed 
partners lower than did' their nondepressed partners, they did treat them differently in 
conversation. The authors suggest depressives elicit negative behaviors from others in 
their environment. Their more negative cognitions, then, would be an accurate reflection 
of the reality they help to shape. This is not dissimilar from fmdings that suggest 
marriage partners are most committed to spouses who confIrm their self-view, even when 
it is a negative self-view (Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde, 1997). Here, also, is evidence 
that depression and negative self-conceptions become self-fulfIlling so that negative 
distortions become increasingly confIrmed and increasingly accurate within the depressed 
person's environment. 
Joiner, Alfano, and Metalsky (1992) conducted research on Coyne's interpersonal 
theory of depression (Coyne, 1976). In Coyne's formulation, the mildly depressed person 
seeks reassurance that others truly care about him. When reassurance is provided, it is 
reinforcing; and the depressed person increases reassurance-seeking behavior to obtain 
more of the reinforcement. This eventually leads to rejection which increases the 
depressive symptomatology. Joiner, Alfano, and Metalsky studied college students and 
their roommates. They found that depression was, indeed, associated with a tendency 
toward excessive reassurance seeking. When men (but not women) combined depression 
and low self-esteem with high reassurance-seeking, they were signifIcantly more likely to 
Realism or Distortion 25 
be rejected by their roommates. The depressed men with low self-esteem who did not 
seek reassurance were not rejected, but were found to be more likable by their 
roommates. Thus, for at least a subset ofthe depressed, social rejection is a reality rather 
than a distorted cognition. 
Children with clear and long-standing depressive episodes evaluated themselves 
f 
more negatively than did their nondepressed counterparts (Kendall, Stark, & Adam, 
1990). Their teachers, acting as objective raters, did not rate the depressed children as 
significantly different from their nondepressed peers on measures of ability and 
performance. If the teachers' ratings can be considered a measure of objective reality, the 
depressed children demonstrated negative cognitive distortions in their self-evaluations. 
In another study of social skills perceptions, depressed psychiatric inpatients 
expressed more dissatisfaction with their social performance than did control participants 
when they watched a videotape of themselves interacting with an age-matched stranger of 
the opposite sex (Gotlib, 1982). They also obtained lower ratings on social skill 
performance from objective raters suggesting that social skill deficits may be an integral 
part of depression. However, nondepressed inpatients showed the same level of social 
skill deficit, so it did not appear to be specific to depression in this study. When the social 
skill ratings were statistically controlled, the depressed group showed a significant deficit 
in self-satisfaction with their social performance. Neither was self-reward nor self-
punishment the direct result of accurate performance appraisal for this group of depressed 
patients. The authors discussed treatments options which might target both social skill 
improvements and improved accuracy of depressed patients' self-evaluations. Dykman, 
Horowitz, Abramson, and Usher (1991) confirmed the fact that both negative cognitive 
distortions and actual social skill deficits were involved in the performance of depressed 
participants when they interacted with others. 
Gotlib (1983) found depressed patients perceived social feedback as more 
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negative than it actually was. Both their perception and their recall of the social feedback 
were inaccurate in a negative direction compared with the actual feedback delivered. 
Siegel and Alloy (1990) investigated the social impact of depression on the 
depressed person's nondepressed college roommate. They found that depressed men 
received negative evaluations and emotional reactions from their roommates. The 
depressed men also accurately perceived these negative reactions. That is, they did not 
negatively or positively distort their understanding of their roommates' reactions to them. 
Rather, depressed men accurately and correctly rated the social responses of their 
roommates to them. Depressed women, on the other hand, felt their roommates evaluated 
them more negatively than the roommates actually did. The roommates of depressed 
women did not evaluate them any more negatively than did the roommates of 
nondepressed women. In short, depressed men received negative social evaluations and 
perceived them. Depressed women received normal social evaluations and perceived 
their social impact to be more negative than it actually was. Nondepressed participants 
had an overly positive view about how their depressed roommates felt about them. This 
mixed combination of results demonstrates evidence of depressive realism (depressed 
men), self-enhancing positive distortions (nondepressed men and women), and negative 
distortions (depressed women). 
Attributional Style as a Causal Factor in Depression 
Peterson and Seligman (1984) have developed a dimensional theory suggesting 
that individuals who understand and explain negative events in terms of the dimensions 
of internal, stable, and global causes are prone to develop depression when negative 
events occur. Peterson (1992) also suggests that causal explanations for good events are 
independent of causal explanations for bad events. It is the internal, stable, and global 
Realism or Distortion 27 
attributions that people use to explain and understand negative events that lead to 
depressed affect. Attributions for positive events are independent; but people with a 
pessimistic attributional style often tend to explain positive events in external, unstable, 
and specific ways. This diathesis-stress model posits internal, stable, and global 
attributions as th~ cognitive style that predisposes an individual to become depressed 
when faced with negative events. This cognitive style is considered to be pessimistic 
because the individual with this style attributes negative events to causes that are his own 
fault (internal), that will remain present for a long time (stable), and that affect many 
situations and events (global). 
There are a number of studies which suggest that a depression-prone attributional 
style precedes the onset of depression and predicts depressive affect in response to 
negative events (Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982; Metalsky, 
Halverstadt, & Abramson, 1987; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). In one study, students 
were asked to specify the test grade that they would consider to be low and unacceptable. 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) was used to measure their explanatory style. 
When test grades were distributed, explanatory style for bad events proved to be an 
effective predictor of increases in depressed mood for those students who received low 
grades (but not for students who received high grades). Seligman interprets the data to 
support the notion that explanatory style can predict depression in response to negative 
events. A study of prisoners found that explanatory style prior to imprisonment was an 
effective predictor of depressive symptoms at the end of imprisonment. Likewise, in a 
study of breast cancer in women, those who explained their cancer in terms of behavior 
(internal, unstable, and specific causes) were more likely to believe they were cancer free 
after a mastectomy. They were also more likely to be nondepressed. However, those 
women who explained their cancer in terms of personality (internal, stable, and global 
causes) tended to believe they were not cancer free after surgery; and they were more 
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likely to be depressed. According to the authors, these studies support the notion that a 
depressive explanatory style precedes and predicts the onset of depression. They believe 
that attributions contribute to depression and playa causal role. 
DeRubeis et aL (1990) studied the treatment of depression and found that changes 
in attributions from pessimistic to optimistic during cognitive therapy mediated 
improvement in the depressed participants. Those who showed improvements in their 
attributional style from the beginning to the middle of therapy also showed improvements 
in their depression from the middle to the. end oftherapy. 
There is also some evidence that an optimistic cognitive style correlates with 
success in a number of areas. Seligman and Schulman (1986) studied a population of 
insurance sales people and found that those with optimistic attributional styles sold 37% 
more insurance in their first two years on the job when compared with those who had a 
pessimistic attributional style. The optimistic group also tended to remain on the job at 
twice the rate of the more pessimistic sales people. In a related finding, optimistic 
students performed better in a computer programming course than those with a 
pessimistic style (Henry, Martinko, & Pierce, 1993). Of course, these data are 
correlational and cannot determine whether optimism leads to success or whether success 
leads to optimism. 
Longitudinal research by Lewensohn, Steinmetz, Larson, and Franklin (1981) 
casts doubt on the idea that cognitive style or distortion precedes and predicts depression. 
A prospective design was used to study a large community sample of 998 people over the 
course of one year to determine if depression-related cognitions were causally related to 
depression. A variety of depression-related cognitive measures were employed. A total of 
63 (6%) of the 998 participants were depressed at the time of the initial assessment and 
85 (8.5%) had become depressed by the time of the one-year follow-up. Only 10% of 
those diagnosed as depressed were in treatment during the study. Depressed persons in 
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the sample did show higher expectancies for negative events and lower expectancies for 
positive events. In addition, they displayed irrational beliefs and low self-esteem 
compared with nondepressed participants. Participants who became depressed during the 
course of the study did not differ, however, from controls on the cognitive measures 
taken before the onset of their depression. That is, prior to becoming depressed, the 
I 
participants did not subscribe to irrational beliefs. They had no lower expectations for 
positive outcomes nor higher expectations for negative outcomes. They did not tend to 
attribute success to external causes nor attribute failure to internal causes, and they did 
not perceive themselves as having diminished control. People who had a history of 
depression prior to the study did not differ from never-depressed controls on the 
cognitive measures. The authors conclude that depression-related cognitions did not 
precede nor predict a depressive episode, nor did depressive-cognitions remain after the 
remission of the depression. This is a fmding replicated by a number of researchers 
(Blackburn, Jones, & Lewin, 1987; Dohr, Rush, & Bernstein, 1989; Lewensohn, 
Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). While depressive-cognitions did not predict 
depression, they did affect recovery from an episode of depression. Depressed 
participants with more negative cognitions were significantly less likely to improve. 
Cognitive distortions were not related to the etio logy of depression in this large 
community sample because they seemed to emerge concomitantly with the episode of 
depression. The authors remark: 
People who are vulnerable to depression are not characterized by stable patterns 
of negative thinking of the type postulated by the cognitive theorists. Apparently 
people change their expectancies and subscribe to irrational beliefs as a result of 
being depressed, and these cognitive changes reverse themselves as the individual 
recovers. (p. 218) 
There are a variety of studies that demonstrate sometimes confusing and 
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conflicting conclusions. Berndt, Berndt, and Kaiser (1982), for instance, did not [md 
, 
attributional style was useful in predicting depression in college students. Handal, Gist, 
and Wiener (1987), however, found attributional style was correlated with depression 
scores for male college students but not for female students. Weinberger and Cash (1982) 
studied rejection for a date as an experimental situation; this was an attempt to investigate 
a personally meaningful situation as well as an interpersonal situation. Following their 
rejection, (all participants were rejected) the participants uniformly expressed more 
depressive affect. Their attributional style before this negative event did not, however, 
predict their depressive affect after the event. A number of studies have demonstrated a 
correlation between dysfunctional attitudes or depressive attributional style or both and 
depressed affect, but the depressive cognitive style disappears when the depressive 
symptoms abate (Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Hollon, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; 
Persons & Rao, 1985; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). In these studies there seems 
to be similar improvement in cognitive style whether cognitive therapy is employed or 
whether cognitions are ignored and medication alone is employed to bring about 
improvement in depressive symptoms. Such results cast doubt on the notion than 
cognitions cause and maintain depression and suggest instead that negative or 
dysfunctional cognitions are but a symptom of depression that tend to remit as affect 
improves. 
Because the evidence on attributional style is somewhat contradictory, Sweeney, 
Anderson, and Bailey (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship between 
attributional style and depression. They reviewed 104 studies involving nearly 15,000 
participants. Their results suggested that for negative events, internal, stable, and global 
attributions had a reliable and significant association with depressed affect. Attributions 
of external, unstable, and specific causes for positive events also had a relationship with 
depression across studies, although this was a weaker relationship than that for negative 
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events and depression. The relationship between attributions and depression was 
consistent for both college populations and psychiatric populations. 
A number of researchers believe that dysfunctional attitudes or pessimistic 
attributions are mood-dependent and manifest only when a person is actually in a 
depressed mood (Miranda & Persons, 1988; Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990; Peselow, 
I 
Robins, Block, Barouche, & Fieve, 1990). In one study, dysfunctional attitudes improved 
both with successful treatment by medication and successful placebo treatment. Miranda, 
Persons, and Byers (1990) propose that dysfunctional beliefs are vulnerability factors for 
depression even though their research suggests that dysfunctional beliefs increase with a 
depressed mood and decrease as the mood improves. Their conclusion seems to be that 
dysfunctional beliefs are present but dormant and not detectable in nondepressed people. 
When depression occurs, the dysfunctional beliefs emerge and are reported. It is hard to 
conclude, however, that beliefs are a vulnerability factor and a precursor of depression if 
they are neither present nor detectable before the occurrence of depression. 
The Role a/Self-Efficacy in Depression 
Albert Bandura (1997), of Stanford University, explicated a theOlY of self-
efficacy which he described as a social cognitive theory. The theory demonstrates a 
strong cognitive element by virtue of Bandura' s suggestion that what people believe 
influences their motivations, emotions, and actions much more than objective reality 
influences their motivations, emotions, or actions. He focuses his primary interest in 
peoples' beliefs about their own self-efficacy. Bandura explains that if people do not 
believe they can effectively do something, they have little motivation or incentive to act. 
Similarly, if they have the belief that they can effectively do something, they wi11 persist 
and persevere in the face of repeated failures. Bandura's theory posits the fact that 
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efficacy beliefs are the central basis of human behavior, because without efficacy beliefs, 
there is little or no motivation for action. 
Bandura (1997) uses the word agency to refer to acts that are done intentionally. 
He explains that self-efficacy involves the judgments people make with regard to their 
ability to perform certain actions. People will perform certain intentional actions when 
and if they judge themselves capable of performing those actions effectively. Without a 
sense of efficacy, people are unlikely to engage in the acts they believe themselves 
incapable of performing. If people believe they have no power to perform certain actions 
successfully or to attain certain results, they will not attempt to make those things happen. 
Peoples' beliefs in their efficacy affect virtually everything they do, think, or feel. 
Depression involves perceived inefficacy to perform those actions necessary to 
obtain desired goals, to produce personal satisfaction, or to alter unpleasant life 
circumstances. The perceived inability to obtain what one longs for leads to depression. 
For instance, students who believe they cannot manage scholastic demands or form 
meaningful relationships are prone to develop depressive symptoms. Bandura (1997) 
believes in reciprocal influences which can produce spiraling causality, When people 
perceive themselves to be ineffective, they can develop a depressed mood. The depressed 
mood, in turn, lowers their efficacy, leading to still lower perceptions of self-efficacy, A 
low sense of self-efficacy to attempt to accomplish those things in life that will lead to 
satisfaction and a feeling of self-worth leads to depression. Likewise, depression 
diminishes peoples' effectiveness and lowers still further their sense of self-efficacy. 
Bandura suggests that depression derives from a variety of sources, including 
unreasonably high self-expectations, lack of social skill, negatively biased cognitive 
processing, and even the inability to suppress depressing ruminations. He suggests, 
however, that a sense of personal inefficacy is a central, common factor among all the 
subtypes of depression. 
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Bandura proposes a triadic reciprocal causation model. The three primary 
elements of causation in this model include behavior, internal personal factors such as 
thoughts and feelings, and external environmental factors. The three elements interact in 
ways that produce reciprocal influences. For instance, the environment clearly influences 
human behavior; but it is also true that humans influence and alter their environments. 
The influence between behavior and environment is bi-directional and reciprocal. This is 
how Bandura explains the reciprocal influence of mood and cognition mentioned earlier. 
A low sense of self-efficacy is a personal element which can alter the behavioral element. 
For instance, a student who believes he stands no chance of passing the [mal exam in a 
course may alter his behavior by failing to study for the exam. This lack of study-
behavior is likely to lead to a poor exam grade which reciprocally influences and further 
lowers the student's sense of self-efficacy with regard to academic performance. 
Bandura believes that depressed people tend to misperceive their own 
accomplishments and failures. They also tend to alter their recollections oftheir own 
performances in a negative direction. A depressed mood can alter judgments made while 
in that mood. In experiments in which mood was altered experimentally (Forges, Bower, 
& Moylan, 1990; Salovey & Bimbaun, 1989; as cited in Bandura, 1997), an induced 
positive mood improved perceived self-efficacy in the participants, but an induced 
despondent mood decreased perceptions of self-efficacy. Judgements about self-efficacy 
seem to be an important cognitive factor that both influence depressive mood states and 
are, in turn, influenced by depressive mood states. 
Gender Effect 
Participants have not been shown to differ based upon the variable of gender 
when comparing depressed with nondepressed participants in studies on judgments, 
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perceptions, or predictions of various criteria variables. Gotlib (1982) did not fmd gender 
, 
a significant variable when depressed psychiatric inpatients and nondepressed hospital 
employees judged their own social competence during dyadic interactions with age-
matched, opposite-sex strangers. Nor did Siegel and Alloy (1990) fmd gender a 
discriminating variable when studying social judgment and social perception among 
college students. Alloy and Clements (1992) found support for the illusion of control 
among the nondepressed both in real-life as well as laboratory experiments when 
negative events and failure experiences took place. However, the gender ofthe 
participants did not bias or affect any of the independent or dependent variables. 
Similarly, no gender effect was found in experiments that compared depressed with 
nondepressed participants in problem solving (Nezu, Kalmar, Roman, & Clavijo, 1986) 
or predictions of positive and negative events in their own futures (Alloy & Ahrens, 
1987; Dunning & Story, 1991). Alloy and Abramson (1979) reported a series of four 
experiments with multiple comparisons. There was no gender effect in most of those 
statistical comparisons. However, they did fmd that nondepressed females significantly 
overestimated their degree of control in the 75-25 contingency condition when compared 
with nondepressed males. In addition, females tended to be less certain of their judgments 
of control than males during the 50% contingency trials. Tang and Critelli (1990) used an 
experimental design very similar to that of Alloy and Abramson and found that 
judgments of contingency were not influenced by gender. The preponderance of 
exper.imental evidence suggests there is no gender effect that influences results when 
comparing depressed with nondepressed participants whether they are college students or 
clinic patients. 
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Self-Report Instruments 
Self-report instruments were used in this study to assess a variety of symptom-
related variables. Self-report instruments have been extremely useful in aiding 
psychological and personality assessment. They tend to be brief and easily administered 
I 
to patients, helping clinicians to gather a great deal of information in a short period of 
time. In addition, the patient can fill out the forms, which saves the clinician time. More 
of the clinician's time can then be devoted to treatment and intervention rather than to 
data collection through lengthy interviews with each patient. Also, scores on self-report 
inventories can be compared with normative data, adding an objective measure to the 
subjective impressions of the clinician. Over time, repeated administrations of self-report 
inventories can provide data-points that help track progress in treatment. 
In spite of their many advantages, self-report inventories do have some 
limitations. One such limitation is that they do not provide accurate diagnostic 
information on the presence or absence of mental illness. That is, a self-report inventory 
is not a substitute for a diagnostic assessment by a clinician. For instance, the most 
widely used personality assessment tool is the MMPI (Graham, 1990). When Hathaway 
and McKinley first published the MMPI in 1943, they hoped it would serve as a self-
report diagnostic tool The clinical scales were designed to match the major diagnostic 
groups of the time. The MMPI proved to be a very valuable means of gathering 
information on personality characteristics. It was not, however, useful in assigning 
clinical diagnoses to patients. Normal people, for example, often obtained high scores on 
one or more of the clinical scales. Patients in any particular diagnostic group often 
obtained high scores on the corresponding MMPI clinical scale. However, those patients 
often obtained high scores on other clinical scales, as welL The result is that the clinical 
scales do not seem to be pure measures of the symptom dimensions suggested by the 
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scale names (Graham, 1990). For that reason, most psychologists refer to the clinical 
, 
scales by their number rather than the scale name, to avoid confusing a personality 
pattern with a clinical diagnosis. 
The same limitation applies to the self-report instruments that were employed in 
this research project. For instance, the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) has a number of 
symptom subscales; but its strength lies in the fact that it is a measure of overall mental 
and emotional distress (Derogatis & Savitz, 2000). There is some controversy as to 
whether the BSI measures separate dimensions with its subscales or measures a single 
dimension of psychological distress with its global index score (GSI). A number of 
authors, however, have reported that factor analysis ofthe BSI indicates it is most 
informative as a measure of general psychological distress that may derive from any 
number oflife stress issues or diagnostic categories (Boulet & Boss, 1991; Piersma, 
Boes, Reaume, 1994). 
One of the values of self-report instruments is that they can be used to measure 
symptom-change over time. This makes them useful in measuring symptom responses to 
various treatments in groups of patients. It is also true, however, that self-report 
instruments tend to measure the "state" ofthe symptoms at a particular time rather than 
measuring whether or not a person qualifies to receive a specific diagnosis. The Beck 
Anxiety Inventory, for instance, correlates highly with state-measures of anxiety and 
seems to measure the current state of anxiety symptoms rather than measuring anxiety as 
a trait within an individual (Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), having a moderate to high correlation with 
clinical ratings for psychiatric patients, has been found to detect depression as effectively 
as longer and more costly structured interview (Groth-Marnat, 1997). The BDI (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) demonstrated concurrent validity with 
psychiatric ratings ofthe depth of depression in a college population (Bumberry, Oliver, 
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& McClure, 1978). The BDI-II was revised to be more consonant with the DSM-IV 
criteria defming depression. The BDI-II has been established as a valid and reliable 
method of identifying depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Groth:-Marnat, 1997). In 
a University of Pennsylvania clinical sample, a BDI score of 17 or more has be.en shown 
to have a 93% true-positive rate and an 18% false-positive rate for the presence of major 
I 
depression. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Nevertheless, some authors have argued that 
BDI scores are very transient and change rapidly over short int~rvals of time (Coyne, 
1994; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) found that BDI 
scores for college students correlated. 77 with psychiatric ratings made immediately after 
taking the BDI. When the psychiatric assessment was conducted from 1 to 14 days after 
the BDI score had been obtained, however, the correlation between the two dropped to 
.30. Coyne (1994) argues that self-report instruments are not an adequate substitute for a 
more complete assessment ofthe criteria for a diagnosis of depression. He points out that 
research using self-report instruments with college students is analog research, and 
researchers must be cautious when applying conclusions drawn from such research to 
populations of clinically depressed patients. 
Past research also suggests that the use of self-report instruments is safe and 
harmless for the students participating in research projects. Quite a number of research 
projects have involved the administration of a psychological questionnaire or 
questionnaires just before students take an exam in school. None ofthese research 
projects have reported any adverse effects from this procedure (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985; Lay, Edwards, Parker, & Endler, 1989; Phillips & Endler, 1982; Scherer, 
Drumheller, & Owen, 1992). 
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Gathering the Clues Together 
Overall it is not clear that the cognitive therapy premise which holds that 
depression is based upon negative cognitive distortions of reality is correct. In fact, there 
is evidence that suggests the depressed are more accurate in th~ir perception and 
judgment, but the nondepressed have illusions of control, have a self-serving bias, or a 
self-enhancing bias. There is also some indication that neither the depressed nor the 
nondepressed are accurate in their judgments because both groups tend to overestimate 
their control, their social skill performance, or the positive events likely to occur in their 
futures. It may be that distortion varies based upon other factors such as failure feedback, 
the level of reward or ego involvement related to a task. The majority ofthe research' 
points to the depressed having more awareness of negative events such as lack of control 
or of unfavorable social feedback, but it is unclear whether or not this awareness is 
accurate or is exaggerated in a negative way. Thus, it is difficult be sure if the depressed 
are accurate in their perceptions or if they are distorting in a negative way. Likewise, it is 
uncertain if the nondepressed are seeing events accurately and realistically or if they have 
a tendency to distort in a positive direction. There is also research to suggest that the 
depressed are negative, and that this is an accurate reflection of their experience and their 
environment; however, the nondepressed are similarly positive about the more positive 
lives they lead. It may be that depression is an accurate assessment of a negative reality, 
and the nondepressed have more positive or more fortunate lives. 
It is clear that research studying the cognitive distortions of the depressed and 
nondepressed must incorporate some independent measure of accuracy of judgment by 
the groups. We can make conclusions about the relative negativity of the opinions ofthe 
depressed by simply comparing them to the nondepressed, but to determine whether 
those negative opinions are accurate or distorted we need some criteria from which to 
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draw factual conclusions about accuracy and distortion. In addition, facts can be 
determined to be accurate or inaccurate but are neither positive nor negative in and of 
themselves. People can be correct or incorrect in predicting or perceiving factual data. 
The values implied by the labels positive and negative, however, are added when we 
exercise our ability to give meaning to our experience. Therefore, research on cognitive 
I 
distortion must be careful to distinguish accuracy of judgment from the positive or 
negative evaluations ofthose judgments. The depressed and nQndepressed should be 
compared with regard to the accuracy of their judgment and also with regard to the 
meaning they attach to those judgments. 
It is also important for research to measure cognitive judgments and evaluations 
with regard to something that has relevance and meaning in the lives of the participants. 
The groundbreaking work done by Alloy and Abramson (1979) on depressive realism 
measured the participants' perceptions of control with regard to a light bulb turning on or 
off. Such a task makes an excellent experiment but has little relevance or importance in 
the actual lives ofthe participants. 
This research project measured the predictions of students with regard to their 
own performance on an academic examination. The focus on exam performance 
highlights possible distortions regarding the self, which is one of the three components of 
Beck's cognitive triad of depression (Beck, 1967; Beck, 1996; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). Also, an exam is a task that has relevance to each student's life, having a 
potential reward value to each of them. Likewise, students were asked to predict and 
evaluate their own performances on a task that contributed to their own successes or 
failures in their academic careers. Each student was asked to predict a matter of fact for 
which the accuracy ofthe prediction could be measured. The factual correctness of each 
prediction was checked after the exams were graded in order to gauge whether or not 
depression or its absence correlated with distorted estimates in either a positive or 
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negative direction. Before the exam, the students knew how much they had studied and 
, 
how well prepared they felt for the test. They had not yet seen the exam questions, 
however, and some uncertainty was introduced by this fact. Such ambiguity may have 
permitted more or less distortion, if distortion were to take place. After the exam, the 
students had a greater knowledge of what they knew compared with what they were 
asked to produce on the test. That condition created a slightly different environment in 
which to distort or predict accurately. The study was not designed to evaluate whether 
nondepressed students do better on exams than depressed students (though this was 
assessed). The data being sought were more closely related to whether or not depressed 
students had negative cognitions relative to their actual performance regardless of 
whether that performance was good or bad. Likewise, the data indicated whether or Iiot 
nondepressed students had positive illusions relative to their actual performance 
regardless of whether that performance was good or bad. 
The current study tested a number of hypotheses including: 
Depressed students, when compared with nondepressed students, negatively 
distort their perceptions of reality by predicting poorer scores on an examination than 
they actually earn. The null version of this hypothesis is that depressed students do not 
differ from nondepressed students in the accuracy of their predictions of how they will 
score on an examination. 
A second hypothesis is that depressed students evaluate the exam grades they 
actually earn in a more negative way, as demonstrated by a lower satisfaction, than 
nondepressed students who earn similar grades. The null version of this hypothesis is that 
depressed and nondepressed students do not differ in the satisfaction they report when 
receiving similar grades on an examination. There are a number of sub-hypotheses 
related to this overall hypothesis including: 
Depressed students with high exam grades are less satisfied with their grades than 
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nondepressed students with high exam grades. 
Depressed students with above average exam grades are less satisfied with their 
grades than nondepressed students with above average exam grades. 
Nondepressed students with average exam grades are more satisfied wjth their 
grades than depressed students with average exam grades. 
. I 
Nondepressed students with low exam grades are more satisfied with their grades 
than depressed students with low exam grades. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were college and graduate students at a state university in Central 
Pennsylvania. The students were tested during four consecutive semesters of the 2001 
and 2002 academic years (fall, spring, summer, and fall semesters). If a professor agreed 
to have his or her class participate in the project, the students in that class were invited to 
participate voluntarily in the project. A total of five professors allowed their classes to 
take part in the research. 
A total of357 students (77 males and 280 females) from a rural state university 
served as participants in this research project. The participant population ranged in age 
from 17 to 55 with 84.2% of them falling between the ages of 18 and 22 (see Table 1). A 
total of318 of the participants were college students and 39 ofthem were graduate 
students at the university (see Table 2). In terms of marital status, 332 (93%) ofthe 
participants were single and had never been married, 21 (5.9%) were married, and 4 
(1.1 %) were divorced (see Table 3). The racial and ethnic composition ofthe participant 
popUlation is listed in Table 4. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (90.8%) with 
9.2% falling into a minority category. 
All of the participants were taking a psychology class when they took part in the 
research project. Their academic major varied, however, and students from 31 different 
academic majors participated (see Table 5). The largest group of participants were 
psychology majors who represented 51.3% ofthe total pool. Students who had not 
declared a major represented 10.1 % of the study population. The remaining 138 
participants represented 30 academic majors at the college or graduate leveL The mean 
time participants reported studying for their final examination was 5.6 hours (SD = 3.89). 
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The mean fmal exam score among all 357 participants was 65% (SD = 17.58). 
Table 1 
Ages of Participants 
Age Frequency Percent 
17 1 0.3 
18 39 10.9 
19 74 20.7 
20 91 25.5 
21 63 17.6 
22 34 9.5 
23 13 3.6 
24 12 3.4 
25 3 0.8 
26 3 0.8 
27 3 0.8 
28 4 1.1 
29 1 0.3 
31 1 0.3 
32 2 0.6 
33 1 0.3 
35 1 0.3 
36 1 0.3 
37 1 0.3 
39 1 0.3 
40 2 0.6 
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45 
46 
49 
50 
Table 2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
Academic Year In School of Participants . 
Academic Year In School . __ Frequency 
1 st year of co lIege 70 
2nd year of college 92 
3rd year of college 96 
4th year of college 49 
5th year of college 11 
1 st year of graduate school 31 
2nd year of graduate school 6 
3rd year of graduate school 2 
Table 3 
Marital Status of Participants 
~M=a~n~'ta~l~S~ta~t~u~s ________ ~ _____ ~F~r~e~q=ue~n~c~y ______ ~P~e~em 
Single 332 93.0 
Married 21 5.9 
Divo-=...rc=e,-"d:...-__ ~._. __ . ___ 4-'--_______ ""-1.=1 
Percent 
19.6 
25.8 
26.9 
13.7 
3.1 
8.7 
1.7 
0.6 
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Measures 
Just prior to taking their fmal exams at the end of the semester, all students 
completed five psychological questionnaires. The Beck Depression Inventory-:Second 
Edition (BDI-I1) was the first of those instruments (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
I 
BDI-I1 is a 21-item self-report inventory for measuring the presence and severity of 
depression in adults and adolescents. Item content covers areas which include sadness, 
Table 4 
Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Participant Population 
RaciallEthnic Group Frequency Percent 
Caucasian 324 90.8 
African-American 17 4.8 
Hispanic 11 3.1 
Asian 2 0.6 
Native American 1 0.3 
Multiracial 2 0.6 
loss of pleasure, guilt, suicidal thoughts, agitation, indecisiveness, loss of energy, and 
changes in sleep and appetite. The participants answer questions within the time frame of 
the previous two weeks in order to be consistent with criteria for Major Depressive 
Disorder as discussed in the DSM-IV-TR. The questionnaire takes between 5 and 10 
minutes to complete. Each of the 21 items is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3. 
The minimum possible score is 0 and the maximum possible score is 63. The authors 
have categorized scores in the range of 0 to 13 as minimally depressed, 14 to 19 as mildly 
depressed, 20 to 28 as moderately depressed, and 29 to 63 as severely depressed. The 
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Table 5 
Academic Majors of Participants 
Major Frequency Percent 
Psychology 183 51.3 
Undeclared 36 10.1 
Elementary Education 33 9.2 
Communication 16 4.5 
Music Education 13 3.1 
Biology 9 2.5 
Business Administration 9 2.5 
Special Education 7 2.0 
Socio logy/Criminology 6 1.7 
Math 6 1.7 
Art 6 1.7 
Social Work 5 1.4 
English 3 0.8 
Technical Education 3 0.8 
Secondary Education 3 0.8 
Commercial Art 2 0.6 
Meteorology 2 0.6 
Counseling 2 0.6 
History 2 0.6 
Philosophy 2 0.6 
Sociology 1 0.3 
Nursing 1 0.3 
Respiratory Therapy 1 0.3 
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Gerontology 1 0.3 
Guidance Counseling 1 0.3 
Geography 1 0.3 
Early Childhood Ed 1 0.3 
Occupational Safety 1 0.3 
, 
Economics 1 0.3 
International Studies 1 0.3 
BDI (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) demonstrated concurrent 
validity with psychiatric ratings of the depth of depression in a college population 
(Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978). The BDI-II was revised to be more consonant 
with the DSM-IV criteria defming depression. The BDI-II has been established as a valid 
and reliable method of identifYing depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Groth-
Mamat, 1997). A cutting score of 17 was used to distinguish the depressed group from 
the nondepressed. This score has been shown to have a 93% true-positive rate and an 
18% mIse-positive rate for the presence of major depression in the University of 
Pennsylvania clinical sample (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) was administered to obtain a global measure 
of distress and to obtain scores in a variety of symptom areas other than depression. The 
BSI is a 53-item self-report symptom inventory for measuring the presence and severity 
ofa variety of psycho logical symptoms in adults and adolescents (Derogatis, 1993). Each 
ofthe 53 items is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). 
When scored and profiled the BSI provides ratings in nine primary symptom dimensions 
and three global indices of distress. The primary symptom areas include somatization, 
obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic 
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anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. Global indices include global severity 
index (GSl), positive symptom total (PST), and positive symptom distress index (PSDl). 
The questionnaire takes between 8 and 10 minutes to complete. Test participants answer 
the questions with reference to the time frame of the most recent seven days. The BSI 
depression scale has been shown to correlate highly (r .79,p < .001) with the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1981) and 
moderately (r = .50) with the MMPI depression scale (Boulet & Boss, 1991). Derogatis 
and Melisaratos (1983) have reported internal consistency Alpha coefficients for all nine 
symptom dimensions ranging from a low of 0.71 for psychoticism to a high of 0.85 for 
depression, suggesting acceptable reliability for the subscales. Test-retest reliability over 
a 2-week period ranged from a low of 0.68 for somatization to a high of 0.91 for phobic 
anxiety (Derogatis & Savitz, 2000). Moderate convergent validity with MMPI scales has 
been demonstrated for the BSI dimensions (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). The BSI has 
been normed for college students (Cochran & Hale, 1985). 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) was administered to check for possible 
confounding effects of anxiety in the depressed participants. The BAI is a 21-item self-
report inventory for measuring the presence and severity of anxiety in adults and 
adolescents (Beck & Steer, 1993). The questionnaire takes between 5 and 10 minutes to 
complete. Each ofthe 21 items is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 
(severely; I could barely stand it). Fourteen ofthe BAI items represent somatic aspects of 
anxiety and the remaining seven items deal with subjective feelings of fear and anxiety. 
Test participants answer the questions within the time frame of the previous seven days. 
The authors have categorized scores in the range of 0 to 7 as minimal anxiety, 8 to 15 as 
mild anxiety, 16 to 25 as moderate anxiety, and 26 to 63 as severe anxiety. Reliability 
and internal consistency are quite high (Cronback coefficient alpha> .90); test-retest 
reliability is moderate to high with correlations of .60 to .75, and there is moderate to 
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high convergent validity with other instruments that measure anxiety (r > .50). The BAI 
was designed to measure symptoms of anxiety which are minimally shared with those of 
depression so as to distinguish anxiety from depression as much as possible. It performs 
this discrimination better than most measures of anxiety (Creamer, Foran, & ~ell, 1995; 
Fydrich, DowdalL & Chambless, 1992; Siegert, Walkey, & Taylor, 1992). Moderate 
I 
discriminant validity (r < .65) has been reported between the BAI and self-reported and 
clinically-rated depression in both psychiatric patients and nonpsychiatric participants 
(Steer & Beck, 1997). Nevertheless, significant correlations between the BAI and the 
BDI have been reported that range from a low of.48 to a high of .61. Correlations above 
.60 are typically found between instruments that measure anxiety and those that measure 
depression, and the BAI and BDI correlations often fall below that level. Steer and Beck 
(1997) suggest that approximately 20% of what the BAI is measuring reflects unique 
aspects of anxiety that are not attributable to depression or to an overall dysphoric affect. 
Hewitt and Norton (1993) support the notion that the BAI and the BDI effectively 
measure the separate but overlapping constructs of anxiety and depression. 
The Test Anxiety Scale (T AS) was administered to check for the possible 
confounding effects of anxiety related to the pending examination. The TAS is a 37-item, 
true/false, self-report inventory (Sarason, 1978). The T AS yields a score that reflects the 
intensity ofthe internal feeling of anxiety associated with taking tests and examinations. 
The TAS is based upon a trait-model oftest anxiety and measures general anxiety about 
testing situations. On a scale of 0 to 37, scores ranging from 0 to 18 represent low test 
anxiety and scores ranging from 19 to 37 represent high test anxiety. Clark, Fox, and 
Schneider (1998) found the T AS to be a valid measure oftest anxiety among college 
students. There is evidence to suggest that depressed, but not test-anxious participants, 
have the depressive pattern of attributions for positive and negative events. The same 
authors suggest that depressed and test-anxious participants have different attributional 
Realism or Distortion 50 
styles (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987). 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) was administered to investigate 
differences in the attributions between the depressed and nondepressed groups (Peterson, 
et aI., 1982). The Questionnaire poses 12 hypothetical events and asks the respondents to 
imagine themselves in those situations and to rate the causes ofthe hypothetical events. 
There are six good and six bad events listed. The respondents rate the causes ofthe 
events on 7 -point scales along the dimensions of internal versus external causes, stable 
versus unstable causes, and global versus specific causes. Separate subscales are derived 
for internality, stability, and globality for both good and bad events. Overall composite 
scores can be obtained for positive attributions (attributions for good events) and negative 
attributions (attributions for bad events). Sweeney, Anderson,.and Bailey (1986) reported 
internal consistency alpha ratings of. 73 for the composite score for negative events and 
.69 for the composite score for positive events. The ASQ is not easily faked even by 
participants offered a reward to answer in the most optimistic manner, nor by participants 
coached on what the test measures (Schulman, Seligman, & Amsterdam, 1987). The 
reformulated learned helplessness model of depression suggests that a depression-prone 
attributional style involving internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events 
leads to depression when negative life events occur, The ASQ is the leading measure of 
attributional style. Research has demonstrated a high correlation between 
internaVstable/globalattributional style for negative events and depressive symptoms 
among both college students and psychiatric patients (Eschen & Glenwick, 1990; 
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 
1986). In fact, a depressive attributional style has been found to explain 48% ofthe 
variance on depression measures such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Higgens, 
Zumbo, & Hay, 1999). 
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Procedures 
Professors in the psychology department of the university were approached by 
phone and bye-mail to inquire if they would be willing to allow their classes tp 
participate in the research project. A face-to-face meeting was arranged with those 
I 
professors who showed an interest in participating. The research project was explained in 
detail at those meetings. Each professor was advised that the students in their classes who 
agreed to participate would spend approximately one hour of class time completing the 
psychological instruments during the class immediately prior to the semester [mal exam. 
Then, during the class when the final exam was actually administered, the students would 
be asked to answer four brief questions on paper. Five of the university professors agreed 
to allow their classes to participate in the project. 
The responsible investigator attended the last class prior to the [mal examination 
for those classes in which the professors were willing to allow the research to be 
conducted. The researcher read a description of the research project (see Appendix A) to 
the entire class. The voluntary nature of each student's participation was emphasized in 
the project description. Students who did not wish to participate were advised that they 
could leave class if they did not wish to participate, and that the remainder of the class 
would be occupied with the completion of the research measures and questionnaires. No 
student elected to leave class in order not to participate. No student who elected to 
participate ever dropped out at any later stage of the project. 
The informed consent form (see Appendix B) was then distributed and read aloud 
to the students by the researcher. All students were asked to sign the informed consent 
form before participating in the project. Participation was completely voluntary and no 
coercion was employed. Any student who did not wish to participate was perfectly free to 
make that choice. The informed consent form explained the purpose of the research, the 
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expectations of the students if they decided to participate, and any potential risks or 
benefits of the project. The form also explained that all individual test scores would be 
kept confidential and shared only with those academic advisors directly involved in the 
research. The form explained that written results of the research would include aggregate 
data only and would not identify any participant individually. ' 
All students were then asked to complete a form listing some information about 
themselves including name, address, gender, age, race, marital status, current year in 
school, academic major, and current overall grade point average (see Appendix C). 
Students were then asked to complete five psychological questionnaires which 
would take from 33 to 55 minutes of their time to complete. The questionnaires were 
administered in the same order for all participants. That order was: 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 
Brief Symptom Inventory 
Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Test Anxiety Scale 
Attributional Style Questionnaire 
The students were advised that the instructions for each questionnaire were at the top of 
each form. They were given the first questionnaire and advised that they could work at 
their own pace while completing the forms. When they fmished the first ofthe 
questionnaires they were told to bring them to the front of the room and exchange them 
for the second. As they fmished each ofthe questionnaires, they turned them in and were 
given the next until they had completed all five. The students were free to go when they 
completed all five of the psychological questionnaires. 
Immediately prior to taking the fmal exam for the course, the students were asked 
to write down the amount of time they spent studying for the exam. They were also asked 
to predict the grade (as a percentage) that they expected to obtain on the exam. This 
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question was posed on paper to the students as follows: 
Please write down the percentage score you believe you will earn on the exam 
you are about to take. Your estimate will not be shown to the course instructor or to 
anyone at the university. 
Following the exam and before they left the examination room, students were 
I 
asked to estimate the grade (as a percentage) that they believed they obtained on the 
examination they had just completed. This question was posed on paper to the students as 
follows: 
Please write down the percentage score you believe you earned on the exam you 
just completed. Your estimate will not be shown to the course instructor or to anyone at 
the university. 
When the exam was scored, the responsible investigator told each student his or 
her score. Each student was then asked to rate the grade he or she received either as 
Highly Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Somewhat Unsatisfactory, or 
Highly Unsatisfactory. As with the previous questions, this assessment was posed to each 
student with a promise not to show the satisfaction levels to any university personnel. 
Whereas the previous questions required each participant to make an estimate related to a 
numerical (but as yet unknown) piece of data, this question them to make a value 
judgment regarding a lmown piece of data. Taken together, the questions called for 
accuracy or distortion with regard to matters of fact and for evaluations on the qualitative 
meaning ofthose facts. Some students, for instance, may have obtained an 85% and 
found that highly satisfactory while others may have found an 85% to be unsatisfactory. 
The investigator scored the psychological questionnaires and contacted students 
who reported "dangerous symptoms" on the questionnaires; this was done by mail within 
one week oftheir fmal exam. Dangerous symptoms were operationally defmed to 
include: 
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The following answers on question number nine in the BDI-II: 
1. I have thoughts of suicide but I would not carry them out. 
2. I would like to kill myself 
3. I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
Answers on the BSI of "a little bit", "moderately", "quite a bit", or "extremely" 
to: 
Question 9 -- Thoughts of ending your life 
Question 40 -- Having urges to beat, injure, or hann someone 
BDI-II depression score in the severe range (29 to 63) 
Any students who gave the responses listed above received a letter in the mail from the 
investigator informing them of their answers which had raised concerns, reminding them 
oftheir opportunity to seek professional assistance through the university counseling 
center (see Appendix D for example ofletler sent to students). 
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Results 
Analysis of the data revealed there was a significant negative correlation between 
score on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) and actual fmal exam score [r(357) 
-.149,p < .01]. Thus, higher levels of depressive symptoms correlated with lower exam 
, 
scores. Those with lower levels of depressive symptoms tended to obtain better exam 
scores. 
Group Comparisons 
Using a cutting score of 17 on the BDI-II, participants were divided into 
two groups. The depressed group (D) was operationally defmed as those who obtained a 
score of 17 or greater on the BDI-II while the nondepressed group (ND) was 
operationally defmed as those who obtained a score of 16 or less. There were 43 subjects 
in the depressed group and 314 in the nondepressed group. The two groups were not 
significantly different in terms of gender, X2 (1, N 357) = 1.68,p = .20, marital status, 
X2 (2, N= 357) 1.72,p .43, academic major, X2 (31,N= 357) = 12.60,p = .999, year 
in school, X2 (7, N = 357) 5.13, p .64, age, 1(355) = -1.08, p = .28, (2-tailed), or grade 
point average, 1(294) 1.33,p .18, (2-tailed). There was a significant difference 
between the D and ND groups in the variable of race, X2 (5, N= 357) = 18.15,p .00, 
with Caucasians showing higher levels of depressive symptoms. The difference in racial 
or ethnic composition of the groups is not surprising since the Epidemiologic Catchment 
Area (ECA) study of depression found a lower prevalence of depression among African-
Americans and Hispanics than among Caucasians (Kaelber, Moul, & Farmer, 1995). It is 
somewhat surprising that the groups are not significantly different in terms of gender 
since the ECA study also found a higher prevalence of depression among females than 
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among males. 
The mean fmal exam score for the D participants was 58% while the mean exam 
score for the ND participants was 66%. This difference was significant, t(355) 2.87,p < 
.004, (2-tailed), suggesting that depressed participants earn significantly poorer exam 
scores than their nondepressed classmates. The central focus of the study, however, was 
to investigate differences in predictions of exam scores not differences in actual exam 
scores. 
Testing the Hypotheses 
The differences between predicted and earned exam scores. 
The absolute differences between the scores participants predicted that they would 
earn before they took the exam, the scores they predicted that they would earn 
immediately after they took the exam, and their actual exam scores were calculated (see 
Table 6). These absolute differences between predicted scores and actual scores were 
then compared for the D and ND groups. The results suggested that there was no 
significant difference in the accuracy of the predictions (the absolute difference between 
the predicted score and the actual score) made by D and ND participants before they took 
the examination, 1(355) = -1.61,p < .11, (2-tailed). Likewise, there was no significant 
difference in the accuracy of the predictions made by D and ND participants after they 
took the examination, 1(355) = -1. 74, P < .08, (2-tailed). 
Because there were so many more nondepressed participants (N = 314) than 
depressed participants (N 43), two matched groups of data were developed for analysis. 
Depressed participants were matched for actual exam score with nondepressed 
participants, creating two groups, each containing 43 participants. This allowed the 
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predicted exam scores of depressed and nondepressed participants who earned exactly the 
same actual exam scores to be compared. The participants in the D and ND groups in this 
matched sample were not significantly different in terms of gender, race, marital status, 
year in school, academic major, age, or grade point average. The mean predi~ted exam 
scores for the de~ressed and nondepressed participants in the matched groups are 
presented in Table 7. The mean exam score predictions before they took the exam were 
not significantly different for the D and ND groups in the matched samples, t(84) = .924, 
p < .36, (2-tailed). The mean exam score predictions after they took the exam were also 
not significantly different, t(84) = .898, p < .37, (2-tailed). 
Table 6 
Mean Absolute Differences Between Predicted Exam Scores and Actual Exam Scores 
Time of Prediction Depressed Group Nondepressed Group 
M SD M SD 
Pre-exam prediction 
difference 18.14 12.93 14.82 12.65 
Post-exam prediction 
difference 14.07 11.46 11.24 9.78 
The mean absolute differences between the scores participants predicted that they 
would earn before they took the exam, the scores that they predicted they would earn 
after they took the exam, and their actual scores were calculated (see Table 8). Those 
absolute differences between predicted scores and actual scores were then compared for 
the D and ND groups. The results suggest there was no significant difference in the 
accuracy of the predictions (the absolute difference between the predicted score and the 
actual score) made by the D and ND participants before they took the examination, t(84) 
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= .028,p < .98, (2-tailed). The results also suggest there was no significant difference in 
the accuracy ofthe predictions made by the D and ND participants after they took the 
examination, t(84) = -.132, p < .90, (2-tailed). 
An analysis was conducted to determine if the BDI-II score (as a continuous 
variable) was correlated with exam score predictions made before the exam and after the 
exam. There was no significant correlation between BDI-II score and exam score 
predictions made before taking the exam [r(86) = -.152,p > .05] or after taking the exam 
[r(86) = -.147, p > .05]. These results suggest that higher BDI-II scores did not 
significantly correlate with lower predicted exam scores. Likewise, lower BDI-II scores 
did not significantly correlate with higher predicted exam scores. In addition, fewer 
reported symptoms of depression, as reported on the BDI-II, did not significantly 
correlate with the abso lute difference between the predicted exam score and the actual 
exam score for predictions made before the exam [r(86) = -.066,p > .05] or after the 
exam [r(86) = -.071, p > .05]. That is, depressive symptom level did not seem to correlate 
with the accuracy of the participants' predictions of their exam scores. 
Table 7 
Mean Exam Scores Predicted by Participants in Matched Sample 
Time of Prediction 
Pre-exam prediction 
Post-exam prediction 
Depressed Group 
M 
72% 
68% 
SD 
11.18 
12.55 
Nondepressed Group 
M 
75% 
70% 
SD 
13.35 
13.24 
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Table 8 
Mean Absolute Differences Between Predicted Exam Scores and Actual Exam Scores for 
the Matched Samples 
Time of Prediction 
Pre-exam prediction 
difference 
Post-exam prediction 
difference 
Depressed Group 
M SD 
18.14 12.93 
14.07 11.46 
The direction of predictions of exam scores. 
Nondepressed Group 
M SD 
18.22 13.72 
13.76 10.57 
The hypothesis being investigated was that increased depressive symptoms would 
influence the accuracy of a participant's exam score prediction in a negative direction. 
Therefore, the directions ofthe inaccurate predictions were analyzed. In the matched 
sample, 14 people underpredicted their actual exam scores during their preexam 
prediction, while 72 overestimated the exam scores they would earn. It is interesting to 
note that 84% ofthe sample overpredicted their exam scores. Table 9 shows the number 
of depressed and nondepressed participants who underpredicted their exam scores and 
who overpredicted their exam scores. A Chi-square analysis showed no significant 
relationship between membership in the depressed group or nondepressed group and the 
tendency to underpredict or overpredict the exam scores, X2 (1, N 86) .341,p < .56. 
This suggests that depressed and nondepressed participants are not significantly different 
in their tendency either to underpredict their exam scores or to overpredict their exam 
scores. A second analysis of the direction of the error of prediction was conducted which 
included participants who accurately predicted their exact exam scores in addition to 
, 
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those who over and under predicted their scores. Only two ofthe nondepressed 
, 
participants cOlTectly predicted their exact actual exam scores and none of the depressed 
participants predicted their correct actual score. A Chi-square analysis again showed no 
significant relationship between membership in the depressed or nondepressed group and 
the tendency to underpredict, accurately predict, or overpredict actual exam scores, X2 (2, 
N= 86) = 3.39,p < .18. 
One interesting fmding when studying the full sample of357 participants was that 
amount of study time and the actual exam score did not correlate [r(357) = -.061,p > 05]. 
Table 9 
Number of Participants Who Underpredicted and Overpredicted Exam Scores in the 
Matched Sample 
Direction of Prediction 
U nderprediction 
Overprediction 
Depressed Group 
8 
35 
Nondepressed Group 
6 
37 
The mean amount of study time was 5.6 hours (SD 3.89). This fmding suggests that 
increased study time for the exam did not correlate with a higher score on the exam. 
Likewise, decreased study time did not correlate with a lower score on the exam. 
Levels of satisfaction with exam scores. 
Participants were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their actual exam 
score on a 5-point scale (highly satisfied, moderately satisfied, satisfied, somewhat 
unsatisfied, highly unsatisfied). One of the hypotheses of the study was that depressed 
participants would be less satisfied than nondepressed participants with equivalent exam 
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scores. Table 10 displays the number of participants who scored at each percentage level 
on the exam. Analysis ofthe data revealed a number of [mdings. Level of satisfaction 
increased consistently as exam score increased. For example, participants with exam 
scores of less than 40% tended to be highly dissatisfied while participants with scores 
between 91 % and 100% tended to be highly satisfied. There was a significant effect for 
the level of performance on the exam (the actual exam score) and the level of satisfaction 
with the score, F (6,357) = 53.77,p = .000. A univariate analysis of variance posthoc 
Scheffe test indicated higher satisfaction with good scores (61 % or more) and lower 
satisfaction with poor scores (60% or less) (p = .000). Mood (depressed versus 
nondepressed) did not significantly alter satisfaction with exam score level, F (1,357) = 
.374, P = .541. That is, the satisfaction levels of depressed participants were similar to the 
satisfaction levels ofllondepressed participants across the full range of exam scores. 
Likewise, the interaction of the mood variable (D versus ND) and exam score level did 
not significantly alter satisfaction, F (5,357) = .373,p = .867. This fmding offers no 
support to the notion that depressed participants would be less satisfied than 
nondepressed participants who earn similar exam scores. 
Predictions related to good exam scores and to poor exam scores. 
Another hypothesis that was explored was the possibility that depressed 
participants have negative cognitive distortions in a somewhat selective manner. For 
example, is it possible that depressed people have negative cognitive distortions when 
experiencing positive events but are accurate in their perceptions of negative events? To 
investigate this hypothesis, exam scores were divided into "good" scores and "poor" 
scores. Scores were considered "good" (positive event) if they were 61% or better and 
"poor" (negative event) if they were 60% or less. Two factors were considered in making 
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Table 10 
Exam Scores and Numbers of Participants at Each L~vel 
"",E"-,x""am~s"",'c~o~re~ran",.-"",g"""e,---_________ N",--,-,,,,u.mber of pruiicipants in that score range 
~O% ~ 
41-50% 46 
51-60% 51 
61-70% 63 
71-80% 80 
81-90% 60 
this division. The average score for all students on their exams was 65%. More 
importantly, the level ofsatisfuction with the exam grade was significantly higher for 
those participants who earned 61 % or better when compared with those who earned 60% 
or less. Since student satisfaction was significantly higher for scores of61 % or higher, 
those scores were considered to be a positive event. 
The level of exam score performance (good versus poor) had a significant effect 
on exam score predictions made by both depressed and nondepressed participants before 
they took their exam. The .mean difference between the predicted exam score and the 
actual exam score for nondepressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 25.70 
(SD 13.45). The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam 
score for the depressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 25.30 (SD 13.41). 
The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the 
nondepressed participants who did well on the exam was 9.63 (SD 7.84). The mean 
difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the depressed 
participants who did well on the exam was 9.90 (SD 5.25). Clearly the students who did 
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poorly on the exam had a greater prediction error than those students who did well on the 
exam, for predictions made prior to taking the exam. Mood, however, did not influence 
the prediction error, F (1, 86) = .001, P = .980. That is, depressed students who did poorly 
on the exam tended to have the same level of prediction error as nondepressed students 
who did poorly on the exam. Likewise, depressed students who did well on the exam 
tended to have the same level of prediction error as nondepressed students who did well 
on the exam. The interaction of mood (D versus ND) and exam score level (good versus 
poor) also did not influence exam score predictions, F (1, 86) .020, p = .887. 
Similar results were obtained for exam score predictions made after taking the 
exam. The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score 
for nondepressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 18.70 (SD 11.92). The 
mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for 
depressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 19.54 (SD 12.21). The mean 
difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for nondepressed 
participants who did well on the exam was 8.08 (SD 4.38). The mean difference between 
the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the depressed participants who 
did well on the exam was 7.78 (SD 6.28). Again, the students who did poorly on the 
exam had greater levels of prediction error than the students who did well on the exam. 
Mood, again, did not influence the prediction error, F (1, 86) = .018, p = .90. The 
interaction of mood (D versus ND) and exam score level (good versus poor) also did not 
influence the exam score predictions, F (1, 86) = .077, p = .78. 
Interesting correlations that emerged. 
The central hypotheses of this study were not supported by the fmdings. It did not 
appear that depressed participants ditlered fromnondepressed participants in the 
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accuracy oftheir predictions related to their final exam scores. Data on a variety of other 
variables that were peripheral to the central hypotheses ofthis study were obtained in the 
course of the research. A correlational matrix was calculated for those variables (see 
Table 11). These fmdings will be reported as a matter of interest, but must be interpreted 
with some caution because calculating multiple correlations on multiple factors will yield 
some significant correlations purely by chance. The chances of making a Type I error, or 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, increase with the calculation of multiple 
correlations. 
BDI-II score and attributional style were negatively correlated [r(357) = -.318,p 
< .01]. This suggests that higher depression scores are correlated with more negative 
attributional style. TIllS finding is consistent with the research on attributional style. . 
Age and overall grade point average were positively correlated [1'(296) = .239,p < 
.01]. This correlation suggests that older students tended to have higher grade point 
averages. Amount of time spent studying for the final exam also con'elated with age 
[r(357) = .154,p < .01]. Taken together these fmdings suggest that older students tend to 
spend more tin1e studying for their fmal exams and this tends to be reflected in higher 
overall grade point averages. 
Overall grade point average and score on the Test Anxiety Scale were negatively 
correlated [r(296) -.203, p < .01J. This fmding suggests that as the level of test anxiety 
increases, grade point average decreases. Actual exam score and score on the Test 
Anxiety Scale also negatively correlated [r(357) -.258,p < .01]. In an interesting 
fmding, the amount oftin1e spent studying for the final exam and the score on the Test 
Anxiety Scale were positively correlated [r(357) .213,p < .01]. Taken together, these 
fmdings suggest that test anxious participants spend more time studying for exams but 
obtain poorer exam scores and poorer GPA's than their non-test anxious counterparts. 
Higher GP A correlated with higher exam score prediction error for both 
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Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
65 
Grade Point BAl TAS 
Age 1.00 .24** .01 .08 
Grade Point Average .24** 1.00 -.04 -.20* 
BAl .01 -.04 1.00 .50*' 
TAS -.08 -.20** .50** 1.00 
BSI Somatization .02 -.05 .72 .36*' 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive -.00 -.10 .61 ** .47*' 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity -.02 -.04 .46** .38*' 
BSI Depression -.04 -.06 .54** .40*' 
. BSI Anxiety .08 .02 .68** .43*' 
BSI Hostility .02 -.10 .54** .33*' 
BSI Phobic Anxiety -.04 .00 .44** .28*' 
BSI Paranoid Ideation -.00 -.13* .49** .38*' 
BSI Psychoticism .07 *.07 .50** .35*' 
BSI Global Severity Index .03 -.10 .68** .49*' 
BSI Positive Symptom Total .02 -.09 .67** .50*' 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress .01 -.09 .62** .34*' 
ASQ .01 -.02 -.03 -.10 
Study time .15** -.07 .08 .21 *' 
Exam Score .02 .51 ** -.04 -.26* 
Pre-Exam Prediction .05 .29** -.10 -.2*~ 
Post-Exam Prediction -.00 .28** -.09 -.23* 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
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Table 11 

Correlations for Variables SeQarate from theQentratHYQothese~ 

BSI Somatization BSI Obsessive 
Age .02 -.00 
Grade Point Average -.05 -.10 
BAI .72** .61 ** 
TAS .36** 047 
BSI Somatization 1.00 049** 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive 049** 1.00 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity 040** .58 
BSI Depression 043** .64** 
BSI Anxiety .57** .62** 
BSI Hostility .51 ** .58 
BSI Phobic Anxiety .39** 044** 
BSI Paranoid Ideation 041 ** .58** 
BSI Psychoticism Al ** .59** 
BSI Global Severity Index .64** .82** 
BSI Positive Symptom Total .64** .81 ** 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress .57** .68** 
ASQ -.01 
-.11 ** 
Study time .04 .01 
Exam Score -.05 -.02 
Pre-Exam Prediction -.08 -.15** 
Post-Exam Prediction -.05 -.14** 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
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Table 11 
Correlations for Variabl~s Separate from the Central HYnotheses 
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BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity B SI Depression 
Age -.02 .04 
Grade Point Average -.04 -.06 
BAI .46** .54** 
TAS .38** .40** 
BSI Somatization .40** .43** 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive .58** .(j4** 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity 1.00 .64** 
BSI Depression .64** 1.00 
BSI Anxiety .52** .56** 
BSI Hostility .52** .64** 
ESI Phobic Anxiety .51 ** .44** 
BSI Paranoid Ideation .62** .63** 
BSI Psychoticism .66** .79** 
BSI Global Severity Index .75** .80** 
EST Positive Symptom Total .75** .80** 
ESI Positive Symptom Distress .61 ** .63** 
ASQ -.27** -.28** 
Study time -.01 .09 
Exam Score -.04 -.04 
Pre-Exam Prediction -.11 * -.06 
Post-Exam Prediction -.12* -.09 
* Significant at .05 level 
* * Significant at .01 level 
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. Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
BSI Anxiety BSI Hostility BSI Phobic Anxiet) 
Age *08 .02 -.04 
Grade Point Average .02 -.10 .00 
BAI .68** .54** .44** 
TAS .43** .33** .28** 
BSI Somatization .57** .51 ** .39** 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive .62** .58** .44** 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity .52** .52** .51 ** 
BSI Depression .56** .64** .44** 
BSI Anxiety 1.00 .55** .48** 
BSI Hostility .55** 1.00 .40** 
BSI Phobic Anxiety .48** .40** 1.00 
BSI Paranoid Ideation .52** .57** .41** 
BSI Psychoticism .56** .58** .47** 
BSI Global Severity Index .75** .74** .56** 
BSI Positive Symptom Total .77** .74** .56** 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress .58** .64** .51 ** 
ASQ -.18** 19** -.16** 
Study time .15** .07 .05 
Exam Score .03 -.02 -.03 
Pre-Exam Prediction -.01 -.09 -.01 
Post-Exam Prediction .00 -.01 -.04 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
Realism or Distorti~n 69 
Table 11 
i:Q1Telationsior Variables ~eparate from the Central Hypotheses 
BSI Paranoid Ideation BSI 
Age -~OO .07 
Grade Point Average -.13* -.07 
BAl .49** .50** 
TAS .38** .35** 
BST Somatization .41 ** .41 ** 
BST Obsessive Compulsive .56** .59** 
BST Interpersonal Sensitivity .62** .66** 
BSI Depression .63** .79** 
BST Anxiety .52** .56** 
BSI Hostility .57** .58** 
BSI Phobic Anxiety .41 ** .47** 
BSI Paranoid Ideation 1.00 .66** 
BST Psychoticism .66** 1.00 
BSI Global Severity Index .73** .78** 
BST Positive Symptom Total .74** .77** 
BST Positive Symptom Distress .60** .65** 
ASQ -.13* -.28** 
Study time .07 .05 
Exam Score -.08 -.06 
Pre-Exam Prediction -.10 -.08 
Post-Exam Prediction -.08 -.10 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
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Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
BSI Global Index BSI Positive Total 
Age .03 .02 
Grade Point Average -.10 -.09 
BAI .68** .67** 
TAS .49** .50** 
BSI Somatization .64** .64** 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive .82** .81 ** 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity .7S** .75** 
BSI Depression .80** .80** 
BSI Anxiety .7S** .77** 
BSI Hostility .74** .74** 
BSI Phobic Anxiety .S6** .56** 
BSI Paranoid Ideation .73** .74** 
BSI Psychoticism .78** .77** 
BSI Global Severity Index 1.00 .96** 
BSI Positive Symptom Total .96** LOO 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress .78** .69** 
ASQ -.26** -.24** 
Study time .06 .07 
Exam Score -.04 -.03 
Pre-Exam Prediction -.09 -.09 
Post-Exam Prediction -.11 * -.10 
* Significant at .OS level 
**Significant at .01 level 
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Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
BSI Positive Distress 
Grade Point Average 
RAJ 
TAS 
BSI Somatization 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity 
BSI Depression 
BSI Anxiety 
BSI Hostility 
BSI Phobic Anxiety 
BSI Paranoid Ideation 
BSI Psychoticism 
BSI Global Severity Index 
BSI Positive Symptom Total 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress 
ASQ 
Study time 
Exmn Score 
Pre-Exam Prediction 
Post-Exam Prediction 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
.01 
-.09 
.62** 
.34** 
.57** 
.68** 
.61 ** 
.63** 
.58** 
.64** 
.51 ** 
.60** 
.65** 
.78** 
.69** 
1.00 
-.22** 
-.01 
-.10 
-.16** 
-.14** 
.02 
-.04 
-.22** 
15** 
-.24** 
-.72** 
-.28** 
-.18** 
-.19** 
-.16** 
-.13** 
-.28** 
-.26** 
-.24** 
-.21** 
1.00 
-.01 
+.06 
.02 
.04 
Realism or Distortion 72 
Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
Time Exam Score 
Age .15** .12 
Grade Point Average -.07 .15** 
BAI .08 -.04 
TAS .21 ** -.26** 
BSI Somatization .04 -.05 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive .01 -.02 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity -.01 -.04 
BSI Depression .09 -.04 
BSI Anxiety .15** .03 
BSI Hostility .07 -.02 
BSI Phobic Anxiety .05 -.03 
BSI Paranoid Ideation .07 -.08 
BSI Psychoticism .05 -.06 
BSI Global Severity Index .06 -.04 
BSI Positive Symptom Total .07 -.03 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress -.01 -.10 
ASQ -.01 -.06 
Study time 1.00 -.06 
Exam Score -.06 1.00 
Pre-Exam Prediction .10 .54** 
Post-Exam Prediction -.00 .70** 
* Significant at .05 level 
* * Significant at .011evel 
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Table 11 
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses 
Pre-Exam Prediction Post-Exam Prediction 
Age 
Grade Point Average 
BAJ: 
TAS 
BSI Somatization 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive 
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity 
BSI Depression 
BSI Anxiety 
BSI Hostility 
BSI Phobic Anxiety 
BSI Paranoid Ideation 
BSI Psychoticism 
BSI Global Severity Index 
BSI Positive Symptom Total 
BSI Positive Symptom Distress 
ASQ 
Study time 
Exam Score 
Pre-Exam Prediction 
Post-Exam Prediction 
* Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
.05 
.29** 
-.10 
-.21 ** 
-.08 
-.15** 
-.11 * 
-.06 
.01 
-.09 
-.01 
-.1 0 
-.08 
-.09 
-.09 
-.16** 
.02 
.10 
.54** 
1.00 
.74** 
-.00 
.28** 
-.09 
-.23** 
-.05 
-.14** 
-.12** 
-.09 
.00 
-.01 
-.04 
-.08 
-.10 
-.11 * 
-.10 
-.14** 
.04 
.00 
.70** 
.74** 
1.00 
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predictions made before taking the exam [r(357) = .290,p < .01] and after taking the 
exam [r(357) = .278,p < .01]. Since the majority of participants tended to ~verestimate 
the exam score they would earn, the participants with the higher GPA's tended to 
overestimate their exam scores more than did the participants with the lower GPA's. 
Interestingly, Test Anxiety Scale scores tended to moderate tpe tendency to overestimate 
exam scores. Test anxiety was negatively correlated with prediction error. The higher the 
test anxiety, the lower the prediction error for predictions made before the exam [r(357) = 
-.213,p < .01] and after taking the exam [r(357) = -.227,p < .01]. 
Not surprisingly, exam score and grade point average were correlated [r(357) = 
.514,p< .01]. Clinical measures also tended to correlate. The Beck Anxiety Inventory 
scores correlated with the Test Anxiety Scale scores [r(357) = .502,p < .01]. Both the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory [r(357) = .682, p < .01] and the Test Anxiety Scale [r(357) = 
A92,p < .01] correlated with the Global Severity Index of the Brief Symptom Inventory. 
A positive attributional style, as measured by the Attributional Style Questionnaire, was 
negatively correlated with scores on the Beck Anxiety Scale [r(357) -.223,p < .01], the 
Test Anxiety Scale [r(357) = -.217,p < .01], and the Global Severity Index of the Brief 
Symptom Inventory [r(357) = -.263,p < .01]. 
Marital status, F (2,356) = 1.55,p = .21 for predictions made before the exam 
and F (2.356) 1.96,p:;:: .14 for predictions made after the exam, and gender, F (1, 
356) = .71,p = 040 for predictions made before the exam and F (1,356) = 1.55,p = .21 
for predictions made after taking the exam, did not significantly influence predictive 
accuracy. The participant's year in school did influence prediction error for exam score 
predictions made before, F(7, 357) = 7.75,p < .00, and after, F(7, 357) 5.27,p < .00, 
taking the exam. Posthoc analysis revealed that juniors and seniors in college were much 
more likely to predict their exam scores inaccurately than were freshmen (p = .000) and 
sophomores (p = .002). 
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Discussion 
The present study attempts to understand the accuracy of judgments made by 
depressed and by nondepressed participants in order to know if negative cognitive 
distortions would be characteristic of the depressed participants. One strength of the 
study is that it compares the judgments of depressed and of nondepressed participants 
using an objective measure of reality (exam score) as the criterion for determining if 
cognitions are distorted or accurate. Another strength of the study is that it compares an 
estimate of future performance with an estimate of immediate past performance and 
compares both estimates with actual measurable performance. In addition, both depressed 
and nondepressed participants evaluated their actual performance when they knew what 
exam score they had earned. This step in the research allows us to see if depressed 
participants negatively distort their evaluations of their performance regardless of 
whether or not they distort their estimate oftheir performance. The task being evaluated 
was one which had personal meaning in the lives of the participants. Unlike experiments 
in which participants are asked to solve anagrams or estimate their control of a light bulb 
turning on or off, these participants were asked to predict and evaluate their performance 
on a task which was relevant to their success or failure in school. Such a task has 
implications for a participant's self-assessment of personal qualities such as competence, 
intelligence, and effort. 
The results ofthis study do not support the notion that depressed students have 
negative cognitive distortions of reality when compared with nondepressed students. 
Both depressed and nondepressed students tended to overestimate the scores they would 
earn on a college or graduate school final exam, and the two groups were not 
significantly different in their predictions ofthe scores they would earn. 
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The differences between predicted and earned exam scores. 
A number of different approaches to the data were carried out. The absolute 
differences between the exam scores that participants predicted they would earn and the 
exam scores they actually earned were calculated and compared for the depressed and the 
nondepressed participants. There was no significant difference between the depressed and 
the nondepressed groups in this measure of their predictiv(f accuracy. 
Because there were so many more nondepressed participants (N=314) in the full 
sample than depressed participants (N=43), there was some concern that a true difference 
between the groups might be masked by the preponderance of nondepressed participants 
in the pool. Therefore, matched groups of depressed and nondepressed participants were 
created, each containing 43 participants. Using this matched-sample data, the absolute 
differences between the exam scores participants predicted that they would earn and the 
exam scores that they actually earned were calculated and compared for the depressed 
and nondepressed groups. There was no significant difference between the depressed and 
the nondepressed groups in this measure of their predictive accuracy. 
The analysis ofthe absolute difference data for both the full sample and the 
matched-group sample suggests that there is no difference between depressed and 
nondepressed students in the accuracy of their exam score predictions. Neither group 
showed themselves to be more accurate or less accurate because the accuracy of their 
predictions was so similar. In other words, the depressed participants did not distort in an 
overly negative way compared with the nondepressed. Likewise, the nondepressed did 
not distort in an overly positive way compared with the depressed. Inaccuracy of 
prediction, which can also be thought of as distortion, was similar for both groups; and 
both groups tended to be highly overly optimistic in predicting the exam scores they 
expected. 
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The BDI-II score itself (without using the score to divide participants into 
depressed and nondepressed groups) was analyzed along with exam score predictions 
made both before and after taking the examination. There was no significant correlation 
between BDI-II score and exam score predictions made either before or after taking the 
examination. This result suggests that higher BDI-II scores, which represent higher levels 
of depressive symptoms, do not significantly correlate with lower predicted exam scores. 
The more depressed participants did not seem to distort realit)l by expecting to obtain 
lower exam scores. Likewise, the less depressed participants did not seem to distort 
reality by predicting higher exam scores. Nor did The BDI-II score, viewed as a 
continuous variable, correlate with the absolute difference between the predicted exam 
score and the actual exam score. Thus, depressive symptom level did not correlate with 
absolute difference scores as a measure of predictive accuracy. 
The direction of predictions of exam scores. 
Because cognitive distortions may influence not only the direction of predictive 
inaccuracy, but also the amount of predictive inaccuracy, the direction of the participants' 
predictive inaccuracies was also analyzed. For example. cognitive theory not only 
suggests that depressed participants will make inaccurate predictions but also that their 
inaccuracies will be in a negative direction. Statistical analysis showed no difference 
between depressed and nondepressed participants in their tendencies to underpredict, 
overpredict or accurately predict their exam scores. The majority of participants in both 
groups tended to overestimate the scores they would obtain on the final examination, and 
neither the depressed nor the nondepressed participants were significantly different in this 
tendency to overestimate. 
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Predictions related to good exam scores and to poor exam scores. 
Because depressed participants may be selective in their cognitive distortions, the 
data were analyzed to see if depressed participants were more accurate in their cognitions 
of negative events but negatively distorted their cognitions when experiencing more 
positive events. A positive event, for the purposes of this study, was operationally defined 
as better performance on the exam as reflected by a higher exam score, although a 
negative event was similarly defmed as poorer perfonnance on the exam as reflected by a 
lower exam score. The results clearly indicated that the prediction made by depressed and 
nondepressed participants were very similar whether the participants scored well or 
poorly on the exam. Thus, depressed participants did not make more accurate predictions 
than their nondepressed counterparts when negative events occurred and poor exam 
scores were earned. Likewise, depressed participants did not make more negative 
predictions than their nondepressed counterparts when positive events occurred such as 
scoring well on the exam. 
Levels of satisfaction with exam scores. 
Another level of investigation sought to learn if depressed participants evaluated 
their perfonnance more negatively than nondepressed participants. Participants were 
asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their actual exam score on a 5-point scale 
(highly satisfied, moderately satisfied, satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, highly 
unsatisfied). Depressed and nondepressed participants did not differ in their satisfaction 
ratings. Participants in both groups tended to be more satisfied with higher exam scores 
and less satisfied with lower exam scores. 
Realism or Distortion 79 
Some implications of the findings. 
The results of this study suggest that depressed and nondepressed participants do 
not differ significantly in the accuracy oftheir predictions oftheir exam scores, in the 
positive or negative direction of their predictions, or in their evaluations of their exam 
performances. Neither do they differ in their predictions oftheir scores whether their 
scores are high or low. The results of this study were robustly nonsignificant and support 
the notion that those with depressive symptoms are no different than those without 
depressive symptoms in their tendency to distort cognitively with regard to predictions of 
their performance on an examination or evaluations or their performance on the same 
examination. The idea that negative cognitive distortion is a fundamental factor in 
depression was not supported by the results ofthis research. Neither was the notion 
supported by this research that those with depression are significantly more accurate in 
their cognitions about their exam performance (depressive realism). The results of this 
study suggest that those who are depressed are no more accurate than those who are not 
depressed. Tn fact, the depressed and nondepressed participants were more alike than 
different in their exam score predictions and in their level of satisfaction with their exam 
performance. Likewise, the self-efficacy of those with more depressive symptoms, as 
measured by their predictions of their exam scores, was no different than the self-efficacy 
ofthose with fewer depressive symptoms. 
This study supports the notion that depressed students are no more negative in 
their expectations, predictions, or evaluations of their exam performance than those who 
are not depressed. An additional finding included the fact that negative attributional style 
and depressed scores on the BDT-II were correlated. Since the literature suggests that 
those who are depressed are more negative in their thinking and in their attributional 
style, it is possible that the depressed are actually experiencing a more negative reality 
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than those who are not depressed; therefore, their negative cognitions are an accurate 
I 
reflection oftheir more negative life circumstances. Coyne and Gotlib (1983) have 
criticized cognitive theorists for suggesting that depression is the result of negative 
cognitive distortions of reality. They maintain that depression is the result of negative and 
unpleasant life circumstances, not the result of cognitive distortions about life. Coyne and 
Gotlib argue that depression is more closely related to environmental antecedents and 
consequences and is not determined by cognitive distortions. They agree that depressed 
persons evaluate themselves and their performances more negatively but they do not 
believe those negative evaluations are distortions. 
There are treatment implications to the fmding that depressed participants do not 
distort their cognitions in a negative direction. Cognitive-behavioral therapists often ask 
depressed patients in psychotherapy to do small "experiments" to test whether their 
negative thoughts are accurate or not. The therapists expect that patients who collect 
actual "data" with regard to their negative conclusions will fmd that things are much 
more positive than they believed. This therapist expectation is based upon the assumption 
that patients are distorting reality in a negative direction, thus drawing conclusions based 
upon that negative bias. If, however, depressed patients are accurate in their thinking, 
empirical treatment approaches will serve only to reinforce their negative views as having 
been correct in the fIrst place. If depressed patients are accurate in their negative 
perceptions of themselves and their relationships, treatment approaches that focus on 
problem solving and skill building would be more valuable than altering negative 
cognitions. For example, if a depressed patient believes that he is unpopular, it makes a 
big difference whether or not he is correct. If the patient is quite popular and simply does 
not realize it, the best approach would be to help the patient perceive and understand the 
evidence he is missing that confIrms his popularity. If, however, the patient really is 
unpopular, he would benefIt more from social skills training than from cognitive 
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restructuring. Social skills training would help him improve his social standing and 
actually become more popular. 
Interesting correlations that emerged. 
The results of this study revealed a significant negative correlation between scores 
on the BDI-II with scores on the fmal exam. Thus, higher levels of depressive symptoms 
correlated with lower exam scores, and lower levels of depressive symptoms correlated 
with higher exam scores. However, the negative correlation of -.149 explains only 2% of 
the variance. That is, knowing the BDI-II score allows us to predict about only 2% ofthe 
variance in the exam score. The mean exam score for depressed participants was 58%, 
which was below the mean for the entire sample of 65%. The mean exam score for 
nondepressed participants was 66%, or slightly higher than the mean for the entire group. 
There was a significant difference between the mean exam scores of the depressed and 
nondepressed participants, suggesting that depressed participants did significantly more 
poorly on the exam. In terms of exam grades, the average depressed student earned an 
"F" on the exam while the average nondepressed student earned a "D". This can be the 
difference between passing and failing. This fmding is consistent with our knowledge of 
depression. We expect depression to have a negative effect on academic performance 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). A number of researchers have suggested 
possible explanations for the lower academic performance of depressed participants. A 
study by Ellis, Varner, Becker, and Ottaway (as cited in Hunt & Ellis, 1999) pointed out 
that being in a sad mood affects the ability of college students to activate and use prior 
knowledge. Likewise, Hertel and Hardin (1990) found a correlation between depression 
and deficits in memory while Conway and Giannopolous (1993) found an association 
between depression and deficits in problem solving. Clearly, depression is associated 
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with certain deficits in cognitive performance though negative cognitive distortions may 
not be among those deficits. 
Some interesting results emerged which were not related to the central focus of 
the study. Some caution must be exercised in giving weight to these results since 
calculating multiple correlations can lead to some significant correlations emerging 
merely by chance. One surprising fmding was that the amount of time spent studying for 
the exam and the score earned on the exam were not correlated. One would expect to find 
that increasing amounts of study led to increasingly better scores on the exam. This was 
not the case in this research project, however. In part, the explanation may relate to test 
anxiety. Those who scored highly on test anxiety also scored higher on study time. This 
suggests that increased levels oftest anxiety led to increased effOrts in study and 
preparation for the exam. Those study efforts did not, however, appear to bear fruit. 
Exam score and test anxiety score were negatively correlated, suggesting that increased 
test anxiety resulted in increased study time but in lower exam scores. Test anxiety was 
also negatively correlated with overall grade point average. Although test anxious 
participants appear to spend time studying, it does not lead to improved exam scores or 
higher grade point averages. The literature on test anxiety explains that test anxious 
participants tend to focus on distracting thoughts about their own performance fears 
during an examination rather than focusing on the task at hand. This self-preoccupation 
shifts their attention away from the material they have studied and contributes to their 
poorer performance on the test (King, Mietz, Tinney, & Ollendick, 1995; Sarason, 1984; 
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986; Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). 
Thus, it seems that test anxiety is a moderator variable that plays a role in the relationship 
between amount of study time and success on an examination. There may be other 
moderator variables, as well, which were not examined in this project. 
Higher grade point average correlated with higher exam score prediction error fur 
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predictions made before taking the exam, as well as for predictions made after taking the 
exam. Since the majority of participants tended to overestimate the exam score they 
would earn, the participants with the higher GPA's tended to overestimate their exam 
scores more than did the participants with the lower GPA's. Interestingly, Test Anxiety 
Scale scores tended to moderate the tendency to overestimate exam scores. Test anxiety 
negatively correlated with prediction error. The higher the test anxiety, the lower the 
prediction error for predictions made before taking the exam and after taking the exam. 
Test anxious participants tended to be more realistic in their exam score predictions, 
although both depressed and nondepressed participants tended to overestimate the score 
they would earn on the exam. 
Exam score and overall grade point average correlated. Thus, those with higher 
GPA's tended to earn better exam scores than those with low GPA's. Age and overall 
grade point average were also positively correlated. This positive correlation suggests 
that older students tended to have higher GPA's. Amount of time spent studying for the 
fmal exam also positively correlated with age. Taken together, these results suggest that 
older students tend to spend more time studying, to earn higher exam scores, and to earn 
higher GPA's. 
One limitation of the present study is that depression was defmed by the presence 
or absence of depressive symptoms as reported on the BDI-ll. No attempt was made to 
identify a body of research participants who were clinically diagnosed with a depressive 
mental illness. Studies utilizing college students as participants are analogue studies and 
may not actually represent the experiences of patients diagnosed with a depressive 
illness. Coyne and Gotlib (1983) have criticized the research community because they 
believe the majority of what is known about cognition in depression was learned from the 
study of mildly depressed college students. They argue that elevated depression scores on 
self-report questionnaires by college students represents mild and brief experiences of 
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depression that are not comparable to more serious episodes of depressive illness. Coyne 
. 
and Gotlib point out that most depressed students who participate in studies recover from 
their depression within three weeks and very few seek treatment. Hammen (1980, as cited 
in Michael & Funabiki, 1985) found that many participants who were identified as 
depressed on the basis of a BDI score of 16 or greater were nqt actually clinically 
depressed. Sixty percent were not depressed when a diagnostic interview was added to 
the selection criteria. It is possible that the absence of negative cognitive distortions in 
the depressed participants in this study was the result of their depressive symptoms being 
mild and temporary, and that the study of clinically diagnosed depressed patients would 
have yielded different results. It is also possible that measuring students' levels of 
depressive symptoms at final exam time introduces a confound into the study. That is, 
students may be more depressed, more fatigued, more worried, and more sleep-deprived 
at final exam time than at other times during the school year. However, this condition 
may be quite transient; and depressive symptoms may pass away spontaneously as soon 
as exams are over. Future studies may wish to focus on cognitive accuracy or distortion 
in a clinically depressed population of participants such as people who are diagnosed 
with depression and who are receiving treatment for this disorder. If this study design 
were repeated, it might also be wise to measure depressive symptoms using the BDI-II 
several times prior to final exams and include in the depressed group only those students 
who score consistently within the depressed range over a period of time. 
Construct validity is somewhat limited by the use of college and graduate students 
as participants in the present study. The results may not be widely generalizable beyond 
student populations. It is uncertain, for instance, how much the results can be generalized 
to those who never attended college. 
Because this study utilized a correlational design, the participants were not 
randomly assigned to the depressed and nondepressed conditions. Differences or their 
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absence may not be due to the influence of depression as a variable. Instead, they may be 
due to some extraneous variable. For instance, a student who obtains a 71 % and rates it as 
highly satisfactory may not have had time to study and may be pleasantly surprised with 
a passing grade. This variable is unrelated to the presence or absence of depression. Study 
time is an historical artifact that cannot be completely ruled out as a factor influencing 
I 
exam score prediction or satisfaction because ofthe absence of random assignment to 
groups. A follow-up study could be designed to overcome this. shortcoming by actually 
manipulating the depression variable. There are experimental designs in which 
participants are randomly assigned to the depressed and nondepressed groups. A mild 
temporary depression is then created in the participants assigned to the depression group 
by having them read lists of negative and unpleasant adjectives. Such an experiment 
would be an alternative to the design presented here and may be an appropriate follow-up 
to the present study. 
It is also possible that depressed people tend to engage in hyperbole when 
describing their negative thoughts; this hyperbole is not reflected in their actual written 
estimates and predictions. Possibly, depressed people describe things in conversation that 
suggest exaggerated negative distortions ofthought; but they dispense with those 
negative exaggerations when asked to commit predictions, estimates, or evaluations to 
paper. 
In conclusion, the variable of depression score on the BDI-II did not significantly 
affect the cognitive accuracy of exam score predictions, nor the satisfaction level with 
earned exam scores for the students in this study. Neither the notion of negative cognitive 
distortions among the depressed nor the notion of depressive realism was supported by 
this research. A possible explanation of why negative distortions did not appear among 
those with depressive symptoms may be the behavioral notion that those who are 
depressed are more negative in their thinking because their actual life experiences are 
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more negative. Thus, negative thinking among those who are depressed may actually be 
, 
accurate thinking by people in negative circumstances. It is also possible that analogue 
research using college students as research participants, and using BDI-II scores to 
measure depression does not accurately reflect the cognitive accuracy of patients who are 
actually diagnosed with depressive disorders. Nevertheless, this study does not support 
the notion that increased depressive symptoms coincide with increased negative 
distortion in cognition. The predictions and evaluations, in.this study, of those with 
higher depressive symptoms were no different than those with lower depressive 
symptoms. 
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Appendix A 
Explanation Read to Participants at the Start a/the Study 
You are being invited to participate in a doctoral dissertation research project. The 
purpose ofthe study is to better understand some ofthe things that effect a student's 
ability to guess the score he or she will earn on a course examination. We will also be 
studying how satisfied students are with the scores they earn on an exam. The things 
being studied include depression, anxiety, age, marital status, test anxiety, amount oftime 
spent studying for the exam, and general level of psychological distress. 
You are being asked to be in this research study because your professor has 
agreed to allow this class to be part of the project. We hope you volunteer to be involved 
in the study. However, you are completely free to decide not to be involved. If you do not 
wish to take part, it will not affect your grade or affect you negatively in any way. If you 
decide to be involved, you may change your mind and drop out of the study at any time 
without any negative consequences to you. 
If you decide to take part, it will involve approximately one hour of your class 
time and about 18 minutes of your time just before and just after taking the fmal exam. If 
you take part, you will be asked to complete 5 psychological questionnaires in class and 
to provide some information about yourself such as your address, age, marital status, 
race, and overall grade point average. Just before you take the exam for this course, you 
will be asked to write down the score you think you will earn on the exam and how much 
time you spent studying for the exam. When you complete the exam, you will be asked to 
guess what score you earned on the exam. When your exam has been scored, you will be 
informed of your score and asked your level of satisfaction with the score you received. 
Neither your course instructor nor anyone at the University will know what score you 
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predicted you would receive nor how satisfied you are with the score you receive. The 
investigator will know this information as well as your exam score. All information will 
be kept confidential. 
If you do not wish to participate, you may leave class now. For those of you who 
are staying, I would now like to read the informed consent fo~ to you and have you sign 
it to acknowledge your voluntary participation in this study. 
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AppendixB 
nwORMEDCONSENTFORM 
TITLE OF STUDY 
Realism or Distortion in Predicting and Evaluating Exam Performance Among College 
Students 
PURPOSE 
The purpose ofthis study is to better understand some of the things that affect a student's 
ability to guess the score he or she will earn on a course examination. We will also be 
studying how satisfied students are with the scores they earn on an exam. The things 
being studied include depression, anxiety, age, marital status, test anxiety, amount of time 
spent studying for the exam, and general level of psychological distress. 
You are being asked to be in this research study because your professor has agreed to 
allow this class to be part of the project. We hope you volunteer to be involved in the 
study. However, you are completely free to decide not to be involved. If you do not wish 
to take part, it will not affect your grade or affect you negatively in any way. If you 
decide to be involved, you may change your mind and drop out ofthe study at any time 
without any negative consequences to you. 
INVESTIGATOR(S) 
Name: Michael J. Kinney, M.A. (responsible investigator) 
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Department: . Psychology (doctoral candidate) 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
Address: 
Phone: 
22 Kevin Road 
Mechanicsburg, P A 17050 
(717) 697-2244 
Name: Elizabeth A. Gosch, Ph.D. (principle investigator) 
Department: Psychology 
Address: 
Phone: 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
4190 City Avenue 
Philadelphia, P A 19131-1693 
(215) 871-6509 
Name: David C. Hill, Ph.D. (co-investigator) 
Department: Psychology 
Address: Millersville University 
Byerly Hall, Room 208 
Millersville, P A 
Phone: (717) 872-3089 
Name: David Rafael Castro-Blanco, Ph.D. ABPP, FAClinP (co-investigator) 
Department: Psychology 
Address: Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
4190 City Avenue 
Philadelphia, PA 19131-1693 
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The doctors and scientists at Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM) do 
research on diseases and new treatments. The study you are being asked to volunteer for 
is part of a research project. 
If you have any questions about this research, you can call Dr. Elizabeth A. Gosch at 
(215) 871-6509. 
If you have any questions or problems during the study, you can ask Dr. Gosch, who will 
be available during the entire study. If you want to know more about Dr. Gosch's 
background, or the rights of research subjects, you can call Dr. John Simelaro, 
Chairperson, PCOM Institutional review Board at (215) 871-6337. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURES 
You will be asked to complete 5 psychological questionnaires including: 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 
Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Brief Symptom Inventory 
Attributional Style Questionnaire 
Test Anxiety Scale 
These 5 Questionnaires include a total of 180 questions and require from 33 to 55 
minutes to complete. You will be asked to complete a form listing some information 
about yourself such as your name, address, gender, age, race, marital status, current year 
in school, academic major, and current overal1 grade point average. In addition, you will 
be asked, just before and just after you take the course examination, to predict the exam 
score you believe you will earn. You will also be asked to write down the amount of time 
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you spent studying for the examination. When you learn your actual exam score, you will 
, 
be asked to write down how satisfied you are with your score. The investigator will also 
know your exam score. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
You may feel some satisfaction because you have personally taken part in a scientific 
project from which new knowledge may come. You will also have the opportunity to 
participate in doctoral research as part of your academic experience. In addition, you will 
learn about 5 of the most often used psychological self-report questionnaires by actually 
completing them yourself 
You may not benefit directly from being in this study. However, other people may benefit 
in the future from what the researchers learn. 
RISKS AND DISCONIFORTS 
There are no significant risks to subjects who take part in this study. Those who volunteer 
will give approximately one hour of their time to complete forms and psychological self-
report questionnaires. Completing the questionnaires about personal thoughts and 
feelings may cause some emotional discomfort or seem an intrusion upon your privacy. 
However, these questionnaires are the most widely used instruments oftheir type and 
have been used many times with no ill effects to either mentally healthy or mentally ill 
subjects. Uyou feel distressed or upset by mental or emotional problems, we encourage 
you to contact the Millersville University Department of Counseling and Human 
Development for assistance. The Department of Counseling and Human Development 
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can be found in Lyle Hall on the Millersville campus or reached by calling 872-3122. If 
you report serious or dangerous mental health problems on the self-report questionnaires, 
the investigators will contact you by mail to remind you of your opportunity to seek 
counseling. 
There are no known risk or discomforts that will result from being in this study. 
ALTERNATIVES 
Being involved in this study is completely voluntary, and there will not be any negative 
consequences if you choose not to participate. If you choose to take part and then change 
your mind at any time, you are free to withdraw. 
PAYMENT 
You will not receive any payment for being in this study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information and records relating to your involvement will be kept in a locked file. 
Only the investigators, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and members ofthe 
Institutional Review Boards (IRB) of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
and Millersville University will be able to look at these records. If the results ofthis study 
are published, no names or other identifYing infonnation will be used. Your responses on 
the self-report questionnaires will not be shared with anyone other than the investigators 
and the IRB board members. If an investigator is also an instructor, he or she will not 
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have access to your scores on the psychological questionnaires. Your prediction of your 
exam score and your satisfaction with your exam score will not be shared with the course 
instructor or anyone at the University. 
REASONS YOU MAYBE TAKEN OUT OF THE STUDY WITHOUT YOUR 
CONSENT 
If your responses on the self-report questionnaires are incomplete, your data may not be 
usable. 
NEW FINDINGS 
If any new information develops that may affect your willingness to stay in this study, 
you will be told about it. 
INmRY 
If you are injured as a result of this research study, you will be provided with immediate 
necessary medical care. 
However, you will not be reimbursed for medical care or receive other payment. PCOM 
will not be responsible for any of your bills, including any routine medical care under this 
program or reimbursement for any side effects that may occur as a result of this program. 
If you believe that you have suffered injury or illness in the course of this research, you 
should notifY John Simelaro, D.O., Chairperson, PCOM Institutional Review Board at 
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(215) 871-6337. A review by a committee will be arranged to determine if your injury or 
illness is a result of your being in this research. You should also contact Dr. Simelaro if 
you think that you have not been told enough about the risks, benefits, or other options, 
or that you are being pressured to stay in this study against your wishes. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
You may refuse to be in this study. You voluntarily consent to be in this study with the 
understanding of the known possible effects or hazards that might occur while you are in 
this study. Not all the possible effects of the study are known. 
You .may leave this study at any time. 
You also understand that if you drop out of this study, there will be no penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are entitled. 
I have had adequate time to read this form and I understand its contents. I have been 
given a copy for my personal records. 
I agree to be in this research study. 
Signature of Subject: _______________ . _______ _ 
Date: I I Time: AMIPM 
------ -----
SignatureofWitness: ______________________ _ 
Date: I I Time: AMlPM 
------ -----
Signature ofInvestigator: ______ ... _ .. _ .. 
Date: Time: AMlPM 
----
Realism or Distortion 109 
Appendix C 
Subject Information Form 
Please answer the following questions about yourself Information about your 
individual answers will not be shared with your professor or apy member of the faculty or 
administration of the university. 
1. Name: 
2. Address: 
3. Age: __________________________ ___ 
4. Gender: 
male female 
5. Race: 
Caucasian 
African-American 
Hispanic 
Asian 
Native American 
Pacific Islander 
Other 
6. Marital status: 
married 
never-married 
divorced 
widowed 
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7. Year in school: 
1 st year college 
2nd year college 
3rd year college 
4th year college 
, 
5th year college 
1st year graduate 
2nd year graduate 
3rd year graduate 
8. Academic major: 
.----
9. Current overall grade-point average: 
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Appendix D 
Example of the Letter Sent to Students Who Reported Dangerous Symptoms on the 
Psychological Questionnaires. 
(date) 
(address) 
Dear (student's name) 
Thank you for participating in the dissertation research project being conducted in the 
psychology classes at Millersville University. Your answers on the psychological 
instruments administered as part of that research project suggested the area or areas of 
concern that are designated below: 
__ Thoughts of harming yourself 
___ The urge to harm someone else 
_~_ Depressive symptoms in the severe range 
Please remember that if you should desire professional assistance to help you deal with 
the concern or concerns listed above, the Millersville University Department of 
Counseling and Human Development is available to you. Services can be obtained by 
contacting them at: Millersville University Department of Counseling and Human 
Development 
Lyle Hall 
Millersville University 
Phone: 872-3122 
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If you have any questions about your results, please feel free to contact me at 717- 697-
2244. Thanks again for your participation. 
Sincerely, 
Michael J. Kinney 
Doctoral candidate and responsible investigator 
